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The CJEU on Trial: Economic Mobility and Social Justice
ADAM MCCANN*
Abstract: This article focuses on the re-regulatory nature of certain European
economic freedoms and the subsequent effects on social justice. It examines
contentious judgements delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU), wherein private economic arrangements and mobility affect core public goods
(namely health care and education) and certain specified fundamental rights (such as
the protection of human dignity, the right to family life, and the right to strike). The
general critique that cross-border market transactions represent a de facto clash
between solely private ‘economic’ interests and public ‘social’ considerations is
rejected. Such a dichotomy is readily manipulated to evidence the CJEU’s preference
for a neo-liberal private law society – whereby core socializing characteristics of the
welfare state are undermined to ensure market competition. This reinforces the biased
rhetoric of a ‘common interest’ and fails to understand the raison d’etre behind the
economic mobility provisions. Critical analysis requires a more holistic premise
advanced by Kukovec, through which the question of a just balance is actually between
individual ‘freedoms’ and ‘limitations’. With this more balanced nuance, the
compatibility of the controversial decisions with Böhm’s ordo-liberal private law
society may be observed – whereby market actors are afforded proportionate protection
from both state actor interference (e.g., Elchinov, Watts, and Baumbast) and powerful
non-state actor interference (e.g., Laval and Viking). This article does not promote the
argument that all judgments by the CJEU in this regard are explicitly well motivated.
The contrary may be said regarding a number of – now infamous – politically sensitive
cases. Such methodological failure has contributed to fears of a neo-liberal driven
union. However, and this is the crux of the matter, this does not mean that the
substantive outcomes support these fears.
Résumé: Le présent article étudie le caractère renforcé de la règlementation de
certaines libertés économiques européennes et des effets subséquents sur la justice
sociale nationale. Il examine des décisions contentieuses de la CJUE dans lesquelles
des systèmes privés et une mobilité économique modifient – pour le meilleur ou pour
le pire – des biens publics essentiels (principalement les soins de santé et l’éducation)
et des droits fondamentaux particuliers (principalement la protection de la dignité
humaine, le droit à une vie familiale et le droit de grève). La critique générale, selon
laquelle les transactions du marché transnational représentent un conflit de facto entre
des intérêts privés ‘économiques’ et des considérations publiques ‘sociales’, est
rejetée. Une telle dichotomie est utilisée pour démontrer la préférence de la CJUE
pour une société de droit privé plus néo-libérale – où les caractéristiques essentielles
* PhD Candidate at the Centre for Law and Governance and Research Fellow for Endowed Chair of
Law and Governance at the University of Groningen. The author would like to thank Norbert
Reich, Roderic O. Gorman, Hans Vedder, and Dmitry Kochenov for their invaluable feedback on
earlier versions of this work.
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de socialisation de l’Etat providence sont fragilisées afin d’assurer la concurrence sur
le marché. Ceci renforce de manière déterminante la rhétorique faussée d’un ‘intérêt
commun’ et empêche de comprendre la raison d’être des dispositions sur la mobilité
indiquées plus haut. Une analyse critique requiert un principe plus global avancé par
Kukovec, à travers lequel se pose la question de savoir s’il existe actuellement un juste
équilibre entre les ‘libertés’ et les ‘restrictions’ individuelles. A partir de ce principe
plus nuancé, on peut observer une compatibilité des décisions controversées avec la
société de droit privé ordo-libérale de Böhm – là où on accorde aux acteurs du marché
une protection proportionnelle à la fois contre l’intervention de l’acteur étatique (par
exemple Elchinov, Watts et Baumbast) et contre l’intervention de l’acteur privé (par
exemple Laval et Viking). Cet article ne défend pas l’argument selon lequel tous les
jugements rendus par la CJUE à cet égard sont motivés explicitement. On pourrait
dire le contraire à propos d’un certain nombre d’affaires politiquement sensibles –
maintenant tristement célèbres -. Une telle faiblesse méthodologique a alimenté les
craintes d’une union tournée vers le néo-libéralisme. Cependant, et c’est le coeur du
sujet, cela ne signifie pas que ces appréhensions soient confirmées par les résultats
concrets.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel fokussiert die re-regulierende Natur bestimmter
wirtschaftlicher EU-Grundfreiheiten und deren Auswirkungen auf die nationale soziale
Gerechtigkeit. Er untersucht umstrittene Urteile des EuGH, welche die negative oder
positive Auswirkungen privater Maßnahmen und wirtschaftlicher Mobilität auf
wesentliche Allgemeingüter (Gesundheitswesen und Bildungswesen) und bestimmte
Grundrechte (Schutz der Menschenwürde, Recht auf Familienleben und Streikrecht)
betreffen. Die allgemeine Kritik, dass Transaktionen im transnationalen Markt de
facto mit privaten ‘wirtschaftlichen’ Interessen und öffentlichen ‘sozialen’
Angelegenheiten kollidieren, wird widerlegt. Eine derartige Zweiteilung wird nämlich
manipuliert um zu beweisen, dass der EuGH eine Präferenz für eine neo-liberalen
Privatrechtsgesellschaft hat – wobei wesentliche vergesellschaftende Charakteristika
des Wohlfahrtstaates untergraben warden, um die Konkurrenz im Binnenmarkt zu
gewährleisten.
Entscheidend ist, dass dies die befangene Rhetorik eines ‘Allgemeininteresses’ stärkt
und dass damit das Verständnis der raison d’etre hinter der besagten Freizügigkeits-
bestimmungen verfehlt wird. Eine kritische Analyse erfordert eine ganzheitlichere
Prämisse, wie Kukovec vorgeschlagen hat. Dadurch stellt sich die Frage eines
gerechten Ausgleichs zwischen individuellen ‘Freiheiten’ und ‘Einschränkungen’. Aus
dieser ausgewogeneren Abstufung kann man die Kompatibilität der umstrittenen
Entscheidungen mit Böhms ordo-liberalen Privatrechtsgesellschaft beobachten – wo
Marktakteure sowohl gegen Eingriffe staatlicher Akteure (z.B. Elchinov, Watts und
Baumbast) als auch privater Akteure (z.B. Laval und Viking) verhältnismäßig
geschützt werden. Dieser Artikel unterstützt nicht die Argumentation, dass alle
Entscheidungen des EuGH in diesem Zusammenhang ausdrücklich gut motiviert sind.
Das Gegenteil könnte gesagt werden in Bezug auf einige – nun berühmt-berüchtigte –
politisch sensible Fälle. Diese methodische Fehlerhaftigkeit hat zu den Ängsten vor
einer neo-liberal angetriebenen Union beigetragen. Jedoch – und dies ist der Kern der
Problematik – bedeutet dies nicht, dass die tatsächlichen Ergebnisse diese Ängste
rechtfertigen.
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1. Existential Crisis in the EU
Joseph Weiler once wrote of ‘constitutional moments’ that reflect the beginning
or end of a deeper process of mutation in public ethos: a shift in societal
self-understanding.1 The history of the European Union (EU) is inundated with
examples of such ‘moments’.2 For Weiler, the most fundamental moment3
occurred in the aftermath of Maastricht. This moment was not defined by the
content of the Treaty (as important as the Economic and Monetary Union and
institutional changes were), nor by the value of its symbolic significance, but
rather the public debate that ensued after its ratification. The ‘frequently and
deliciously hostile’ public objections represented a threat to the very essence of an
integrated Europe: an unprecedented degree of intensity and public opinion ‘no
longer accepted the orthodoxies’ of European integration. Today, such a hostile
‘constitutional’ moment has reappeared with a vengeance.
First, given the unprecedented current financial and economic crisis, the
acute problem is no longer about just the lack of political and democratic
legitimacy within the EU but the prominent perception of the Union as ‘an agent
of socio-economic distress’. Mass demonstrations across Europe reflect views that
the EU has not merely failed to provide prosperity, but that it is actually causing
the recent hardship faced by millions of Europeans.4
Second, a rather significant imbalance must be stressed. When we critique
the performance of the EU during such a critical ‘constitutional moment’,
intentionally or not, we are making normative assertions about its very existence.
The raison d’être of the nation state may be presumed given the presence of
culturally entrenched and robust structures of political mediation, safeguarded by
democratic principles. This is clearly not the case for the EU. Given the taken for
granted achievements of ensuring peaceful relations and the current economic
austerity, there is no underlying assumption of the EU’s raison d’être. Not unlike
Monty Python’s line of enquiry about the achievements of the Roman Empire,
popular sentiment begs the question: ‘what has the EU ever done for us?’5 Walker
1 J.H.H. WEILER, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), p. 3.
2 Such as the creation of the Schuman Declaration, the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the CJEU
recognition of supremacy and fundamental rights, the ‘empty chair crisis’, the Luxembourg
Accord, the White Paper on the Single Market, the 1986 Single European Act, the 2006 rejection
of the Constitutional Treaty, the 2007 Eastern enlargement, and the recent ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty, just to name a few.
3 At least this was his view in 1999.
4 G. DE BÚRCA, Europe’s Rasion D’Être, Working Paper No. 13-09, Public Law and Legal Research
Paper Series (NYU School of Law, March 2013), p. 4. Another version of this chapter by de Búrca
appeared in D. KOCHENOV & F. AMTENBRINK (eds), The European Union’s Shaping of the
International Legal Order (Cambridge: CUP 2013). For de Búrca, the EU’s entire raison d’etre
has thus been called into question.
5 Taken from the film: ‘The Life of Brian’ (Python (Monty) Pictures, 1979).
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aptly alludes to the increasing need of ‘original legitimation’ for the EU.6 In the
meantime however, it may be said that the EU’s legitimacy is no more than an
ongoing performance-based legitimacy – dependent on the quality of the
substantive outcomes it produces.7
Third, the current crises arrived somewhat like an unwanted guest at an
already unhappy gathering. Following the constitutional debacle in 2005 and the
infamous Laval quartet soon after,8 popular critique raised concerns over the
legitimacy of the Union vis-à-vis its performance, accusing EU institutions of
harbouring Darwinist winner-takes-all motives and sweeping aside national
preferences in a quest for maximized market liberalization. Esteemed philosopher
Jurgen Habermas argued that the entire integration process is distorted by the
neo-liberal philosophy – the ‘original sin’ – that pervades the European treaties.
Political scientist Fritz Scharpf described the European socio-economic regime as
structurally asymmetric and undermining Continental and Scandinavian social
market economies,9 while Roman Herzog accused the CJEU, in particular, of
‘abusing’ the trust granted upon it to adjudicate in an unbiased way. The former
German president10 claimed that the Court in Luxembourg ‘deliberately and
systematically ignores fundamental principles of the Western interpretation of law
and ignores the will of the legislator’.11 Christopher Schmid and Michelle Everson
described European justices of engaging in a ‘schematic’ application of the
doctrine of effet utile to such an extent that it has become no more than a political
statement of effet neoliberal.12 Such critiques, coupled with the economic crisis,
increase hostility towards the EU as an agent of injustice and thereby (however,
indirectly) take aim at the thin leg of output legitimacy the EU has to stand on.
6 N. WALKER, ‘First Session: Justification, Proportionality and Irrationality’, in D. Kochenov, G. De
Burca, A. Williams et al. (eds), Debating Europe’s Justice Deficit: The EU, Swabian Housewives,
Rawls and Ryanair, EUI Working Paper, Law 2013/11.
7 DE BÚRCA, supra n. 4.
8 C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767; C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779; C-319/06
Commission v. Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323; C-346/06 Ruffert [2008] ECR I-1989.
9 F. SCHARPF, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration or Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market
Economy’, 2. Socio-Economic Review 2010, pp. 211–250.
10 And also former President of the German Constitutional Court.
11 R. HERZOG & L. GERKEN, ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
2008.
12 See CH. U. SCHMID, ‘From Effet Utile to Effet Néolibéral: A Critique of the New Methodological
Expansionism of the European Court of Justice’, in R. Nickel (ed.), Conflict of Laws and Laws of
Conflict in Europe and beyond: Patterns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification
(Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2010), pp. 295–314; M. Everson, ‘From Effet Utile to Effet
Néolibéral: Why Is the ECJ Hazarding the Integrity of European Law’, in C. Joerges & T. Ralli
(eds), European Constitutionalism without Private Law, ARENA Report Series (Oslo 2011),
p. 41.
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Research on the legal and philosophical aspects of ‘justice’ at the European
level has gained recent momentum and is dealt with in a number of renowned
studies.13 The focus here is a substantially narrower but not unrelated or
uncontroversial one. It examines whether the CJEU, in particular, has
overprotected economic mobility and contractual autonomy14 to the detriment of
health care, education, and certain fundamental rights.15 As the Court has shaped
market integration, institutional balances of power, ‘constitutional’ boundaries
and thousands of policy outcomes to drive legal, economic, and political
integration,16 it was inevitably going to raise stability concerns in policy areas
traditionally subject to the discretion of the nation state.17 In doing so, such
judicial pioneering was equally bound to conform to some transnational notion of
13 Micklitz convincingly argues that the European market state yields its own model of justice,
which he terms ‘access justice’. This alludes to the concept that all market participants, including
workers, must have a fair and realistic chance to get access to the labour model, as well as to
participate from the benefits of the market. See H.W. MICKLITZ, Social Justice and Access Justice
in Private Law, EUI Working Paper Law No.2011/02 (Department of Law); H.W. MICKLITZ,
Introduction, The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2011), pp. 3–57. For further invaluable reading, see S. WEATHERILL, ‘The
Constitutional Competence of the EU to Deliver Social Justice’, 2(2). ERCL (European Review of
Contract Law) 2006, pp. 135–158. See D. KOCHENOV, G. DE BURCA & A. WILLIAMS, Europe’s
Justice Deficit? (1st edn, Hart Publishing, 2014); F. DE WITTE, ‘EU Law and the Question of
Justice’ (Thesis submitted to London School of Economics and Political Science, June 2012). See
D. LECZYKIEWICS & S. WEATHERILL, The Involvement of EU law in Private Law Relationships
(Oxford: Hart, 2013); S. GRUNDMANN, Constitutional Values and European Contract Law (Kluwer
Law, 2008); G. BRUGGEMEIER, A.L.B. COLOMBI CIACCHI & G. COMANDÉ, Fundamental Rights and
Private Law in the European Union, Vol. I and Vol. II (Cambridge: CUP, 2010); T.
WILHELMSSON, ‘Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law’, 10(6). European Law Journal
2014, pp. 714–733. D. SCHIEK, The EU Economic and Social Model in the Global Crisis:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Ashgate, 2013).
14 Important note for the reader: given their acute controversial nature, this article only focuses on
Art. 45 TFEU (free movement of workers), Art. 49 TFEU (right of establishment), Art. 56 TFEU
(free movement of services), and also the crucial relevant secondary legislation to these Treaty
freedoms. For a comprehensive overview on the free movement of goods and their application by
the CJEU, see L.W. GORMLEY, EU Law Free Movement of Goods and Customs Union (Oxford
University Press, 2010).
15 The focus here is clearly shaped towards the question: what does it do for us? For an excellent
analysis away from the concerns of the substantive outcomes of the judgments discussed here but
rather on the overall approach of the CJEU, see R. O’GORMAN, ‘The ECHR, the EU and the
Weakness of Social Rights Protection at the European Level’, 12(10). German Law Journal
2011, pp. 1834–1861.
16 A.M. BURLEY & W. MATTLI, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’,
47(1). International Organization 1993, pp. 41–76; A. STONE SWEET et al., Litigating the Treaty
of Rome: The European Court of Justice and Articles 226, 230, and 234 (New Modes of
Governance Project (NEWGOV) 2008).
17 S. WETHERILL, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’, 23. Yearbook of European Law,
p. 1.
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social justice, however ‘ill-defined’.18 By examining specific judgments whereby
‘economic’ rights were seen to controversially triumph over measures intended to
protect a basic social interest, observations may be had to the more general
question: is the Court guilty of neglecting the normative objectives of social justice
or does it complement such ideals via its support for a European ‘private law
society’?19
It will suffice for the purposes at hand to make a broad reference to the
normative objectives of social justice itself and an equally broad reference to the
primary legal-economic premise said to lie behind the early EU integration
process: the ordo-liberal private law society. Although this narration is not
entirely innovative,20 it does provide a solid point of departure to understand and
contextualize the rationale behind the judgments at hand.
2. Normative Objectives of ‘Social Justice’ and the European ‘Private Law
Society’
On the highest level of abstraction, the concept of ‘social justice’
underlying this article incorporates normative individualism21 with
18 DE WITTE, ‘EU Law and the Question of Justice’, (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015)
p. 8.
19 This concept will be explained in more detail in the succeeding section. On a related issue, and
important to note at this point, this article does not seek to discuss the conceptual or normative
distinction between private law and public law. Nonetheless, the author is in general agreement
with Norbert Reich that at least as far as EU law and the constitutional principle of
non-discrimination is concerned, the distinction between private law and public law is misguided.
See N. REICH, ‘The Impact of the Non-Discrimination Principle on Private Autonomy’, in D.
LECZYKIWICZ & S. WEATHERILL (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships
(Oxford: Hart, 2013), p. 253; Micklitz offers a useful foundation for a better understanding of the
ongoing transformation process of ‘Nation States’ to ‘Market States’, whereby private law is
understood as ‘economic law, covering not only contract and tort, or systematically speaking the
continental codification, but also public and private regulations of the economy. H.W. MICKLIT,
From the Nation State to the Market State: The Evolution of European Private Law (EUI Working
Papers, Law 2012/15). See also O. CHEREDNYCHENKO, ‘EU Fundamental Rights, EC Fundamental
Freedoms and Private Law’, 1. ERPL 2006, pp. 23–61.
20 S. GRUNDMANN, ‘The Concept of the Private Law Society: After 50 Years of European and
European Business Law’, 4. ERPL 2008, p. 558; C. JOERGES, What Is Left of the European
Economic Constitution? (EUI Working Paper, Law No. 2004/13); A. SOMMA, ‘Private Law as
Biopolitics: Ordoliberalism, Social Market Economy, and the Public Dimension of Contract, 76.
Law and Contemporary Problems 2010.
21 See D. VON DER PFORDTEN, ‘Five Elements of Normative Ethics – A General Theory of Normative
Individualism’, 15(4). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2012, pp. 449–471. For a discussion of
‘normative individualism’ from the perspective of constitutional economics, see S. GRUNDMANN,
W. KERBER & S. WEATHERILL, Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market
– An Overview (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001). For a recent normative individualistic understanding
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elements22 of teachings by Sen23 and Rawls.24 It purports that all legal and
political decisions must be justified in the last instance by reference to the
individual and derive from a type of impartial deliberative forum.
First, this individual-centred approach does not de facto conflict with a
more structured and ‘communal’ understanding of social justice. According to
Sen, the former conceptualization entails both a negative obligation to ensure
non-interference with the individual’s normative preference and a positive
obligation to guarantee the availability of core entitlements indispensable to each
individual’s well-being. In both obligations, the ethical justification is essentially
made back to the individual. Second, if one stands from behind Rawls’s ‘veil of
ignorance’ (without knowing if he/she will be rich or poor, male or female, etc.),
each individual may be seen to have an inherent interest in impartially limiting
certain freedoms to protect other fundamental rights or the equal availability of
basic ‘public’ goods such as food, shelter, health care, and education – taking into
due account the least advantaged individuals in the social order.25 The starting
point is shifted from an object-level dispute (i.e., who gets what) to a meta-level
of fundamental rights, see A.L.B. COLOMBI CIACCHI, ‘European Fundamental Rights, Private Law
and Judicial Governance’, in H. Micklitz (ed.), The Constitutionalism of European Private Law
(Oxford: OUP, 2014).
22 Although these renowned philosophers had certain conflicting views (such as Sen’s rejection of
Rawls’s transcendental institutionalism for a more realization-focused comparativism), this does
not, of course, mean that there is no overlapping consensus. For example, both agreed upon the
idea that fairness is central to justice, the objectivity of practical reason, a fundamental concern
for liberty, the insistence on ‘the fair equality of opportunity’, and the fact that primary goods
should be conceived to protect individual normative preferences. See, for more detail on this, S.
MAFFETTONE, ‘Sen’s Idea of Justice versus Rawls’s Theory of Justice’, 11(5). Indian Journal of
Human Development 2001.
23 A. SEN, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2009). See DE WITTE, supra n. 13, p. 10: where
Sen’s theory of justice is used as a ‘useful starting point’ to conceptualize justice ‘beyond the
outcome of (national) political processes […] and in a tiered structure like the Union’. Indeed,
this is crucial to complement any use of Rawls’s theory, which is arguably somewhat lacking in a
trans- and post-national context.
24 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1999).
For a discussion on the place of contract law in Rawls’s ‘basic structure’, see M. HESSELINK, ‘Five
Political Ideas of Contract Law’, 7(2). ERCL 2011, pp. 295–313.
25 Note, contrary to Rawls, it is not meant here that the basic structure of society which derives
from such a hypothetical choice situation is restricted only to the least advantaged members who
would be ‘fully cooperating’. It must account for all persons and thus include persons with severe
mental and physical disabilities. Admittedly, Rawls does take account of the representation of
such persons but only in the ‘legislative phase’ of decision-making. Hence, the difference
principle is understood here as more than a principle for just ‘structuring basic economic
institutions on grounds of reciprocity’. It is a principle to arrange for a fair allocation of social
and economic entitlements and ought to extend to what Sen describes as ‘hard cases’ (i.e.,
compensation as a result of individual needs or disabilities).
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dispute (i.e., what are the appropriate evaluative criterion to determine a system
of fair allocation).
Essentially, it may be said that what is required is a proportionate balance
between freedoms and limitations to ensure individual desires, without adversely
affecting the distribution of basic entitlements to other individuals within the
democratic polity and social order. This explains why the nation state – with
political structures of robust contestation entrenched in specific historical and
cultural traditions – is central to the realization of ‘social justice’. At the trans- or
post-national level, where such structures do not exist, any contribution to the
attainment of ‘social justice’ will be distinctive and will subsequently require a
distinctive normative perspective.26 Here, we turn our focus to the introduction of
a legal-economic theory known as the ‘private law society’.
This ordo-liberal society, according to Franz Böhm’s seminal analytical
conceptualization,27 is a ‘society predominately based on individual consensus
and market transactions’, which generates personal freedom, economic efficiency,
and social effects.28 The promotion of normative individualism and the taming of
discretionary politics are core for enhancing resource allocation. This concept
requires the protection of private law subjects from the state as well as against the
market power of other private law subjects29 – essentially putting states ‘on equal
footing’ with private law subjects. Böhm should not be mistaken for an advocate
of a ‘neo-liberalism’ – in his version of a ‘private law society’; the rejection of a
laissez faire approach is necessitated.30 A ‘strong state’ is required to build and
enforce a legal regime representing an ordo intrinsic to economic life, which the
26 At the EU level, Micklitz aptly explains why and how a different model of justice at the EU level
challenges national models of social justice. See MICKLITZ, supra n. 13.
27 F. BÖHM, ‘Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft’, 17. Ordo 1966, pp. 75 et seq. See, for a
discussion of this in the English language and in the context of the EU, P. MÜLLER-GRAFF,
‘Private Law Society in the Constitution of the European Union’, in M. Faure, J. Smits & H.
Schneider (eds), Towards a European Ius Commune in Legal Education and Research (Antwerp:
Intersentia, 2002), pp. 57–70.
28 GRUNDMANN, 6(4). ERPL 2008, p. 558.
29 See ibid.
30 The distinction between neo-liberalism and this form of ordo-liberalism is quite an important
one. The latter, as Joerges and Rödl point out, is not concerned about the ‘idea of state
intervention in itself’ but the ‘fundamental character of state intervention’. Although both
neo-liberalism and ordo-liberalism enhance the role of private actors, the former is less moderate
and places more stress on deregulation and laissez faire state policies. The concept of ‘the private
law society’ is also distinct from the post-war German notion of the ‘social market economy’ (as
coined by Muller-Amarack), which is arguably more neo-liberal in practice. This article
respectfully contests Soma’s grouping of ordo-liberals, neo-liberalism, and the social market
economy as the same formula, whereby in all cases the ‘regulation of private relations has to
ignore redistribution’. See A. SOMA, ‘At the Roots of European Private Law: Social Justice,
Solidarity and Conflict in the Proprietary Order’, in H.W. Micklitz (ed.), The Many Concepts of
Social Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 187.
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political system must respect. This is largely based on the assumption that
political opportunism is a real undermining threat to normative neutrality.
According to this line of thought, the fact that State intervention must to
be justified in light of the normative framework to ensure the functionality of
private law mechanisms does not mean it will result in a society that weakens the
delivery of mandatory (national) public goods. Here, an economy that operates
above the quarrels of politics is assumed to acquire more stability and
effectiveness, increasing potential resource allocation via suitable taxation and
thus complementing redistributive social policies (higher health care and
education standards, increased welfare benefits, etc.).
It is not difficult to see why the concept of the ‘private law society’ is
appealing for scholars who seek to understand the raison d’etre or foundations of
legitimacy for European integration. German ordo-liberal thinking undoubtedly
influenced the creation of the European Economic Community.31 The open
market (and thereby private autonomy32) was seen as a basic tool not only to
enhance resource allocation (prosperity) but also to functionally enhance
interdependency (peace) and reduce the role of discretionary state politics
(supranationalism). The concept of the European ‘private law society’33 requires
that fundamental freedoms and competition rules are cast in constitutional stone
away from the follies of national politics and powerful private actor interference.34
Muller Graff insists that the ambit of the fundamental freedoms is understood
31 For an analysis of the European Economic Constitution, see H. COLLINS, The European Civil
Code: The Way Forward (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), p. 91. For further reading, see C. JOERGES, ‘A
Renaissance of the European Economic Constitution?’, in U. NEERGAARD, R. NIELSEN & L.M.
ROSEBERRY (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law: From Rome to Lisbon (2009), p. 29;
H. MICKLITZ The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and the Member States – A Plea for
Judge-Made European Law on Remedies (EUI Working Paper, Law 2011/15), p. 6.
32 See, for an overview of the role of EU law in private relations, LECZYKIWICZ & WEATHERILL, supra
n. 13.
33 See MULLER-GRAFF, ‘Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Privatrecht – das Privatrecht in der
europaischen Integration’, NJW 1993, where he convincingly argues that there is a presumption
for a ‘private law society’ (Privatrechtsgesellschaft) under the EC Treaty. This presumption was
refined by the ECJ in the famous Cassis de Dijon decision. On this, see GRUNDMANN et al., supra
n. 21.
34 See GRUNDMANN, supra n. 20. In this respect, Grundmann recognized (i) the protection of the
‘private law society’ against state power in three instances at the EU level: against intra-economic
activity by subjecting it to the same standards of competition law as private party activity, against
supplying additional funds to market players – namely in the form of state aids and public
contracts, and against legislative action by subjecting it to the demanding case law on
fundamental freedoms; (ii) the protection of the ‘private law society’ against private power,
namely cartels and dominant positions (via competition law and the horizontal effect of
fundamental freedoms); and (iii) the potential protection of the private law society against other
structural imbalances between private parties (via anti-discrimination rules and consumer
protection rules).
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broadly: extending to all types of contracts, all types of parties and players
(Member States, Community, private law subjects), and all types of obstacles,
explicit or not, direct or indirect.’35 This broad reach of economic mobility meets
its limits in the form of measures that are required to achieve mandatory social
objectives.36 As Joerges and Rödl point out, this European ordo-liberal polity has
a two-fold structure (at least in theory).37 At the supranational level, it is
committed to economic rationality and a system of undistorted competition. At
the national level, redistributive policies are pursued and realized.38 It is the
interaction between these structures and the controversial application of the
mobility provisions therein that is of fundamental interest to the study at hand.
The succeeding sections examine the substantive outcome of CJEU
judgments on certain economic mobility rights in the field of health care (s. 3),
education (s. 4), and fundamental rights protection (s. 5). Finally, it will identify
the degree of conformity between the decisions and Bohm’s normative framework
of the private law society and thus the subsequent degree of (dis)engagement the
Court has with the more general objectives of ‘social justice’ in the
aforementioned policy domains.
3. Health Care
Given the abstract concept of ‘social justice’ above, health care clearly entails a
double obligation for the state. On the one hand, it is a vital, fundamental
entitlement that must be equally available to each individual (positive obligation).
Few rights are worthy of protection if one is expected to suffer severe pain or a
premature death. On the other hand, health care is not only about treatment
35 See MULLER-GRAFF, supra n. 33. See GRUNDMANN et al., supra n. 21. This broad understanding fits
neatly into Micklitz concept of access justice.
36 These are what Theodore Lowi describes as the most ‘political’ of policies: mandatory public
policy rules (market breaking). On this, see C. JOERGES & F. RODL, Social Market Economy as
Europe’s Social Model? (EUI Working Paper, Law No. 2004/8).
37 Joerges and Rodl claim that the old economic constitution inspired by ordo-liberal ideals was all
but eroded during the third phase of the European integration process: the turn to governance
and the erosion of the rule of law. The author here does not believe that this statement holds true
at all levels of EU integration and intends to evidence this with regard to the CJEU decisions
examined herein. However, on a related note, the author largely agrees with Joerges and Rodl’s
criticisms of the term ‘social market economy’ adopted in the Lisbon Treaty. This article will not
discuss the value (or otherwise) the insertion of the term ‘social market economy’ may have as a
model for Europe. However, given the close connection between this concept and that of the
‘private law society’ examined here, inevitable conclusions may, of course, be drawn as to
whether the substantive outcomes of certain CJEU decisions may fit within the ideals of a
potential ‘social market economy’.
38 JOERGES & RODL, ‘Informed Politics, Formalised Law and the Social Deficit of European
Integration: Reflections after the Judgements of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, 15(1). ELJ
(European law Journal) 2009, pp. 1–19.
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required for one’s survival and basic well-being. It encompasses the right to be
free to acquire a particular treatment in a particular clinic as an expression of
one’s normative preference and contractual autonomy (negative obligation).
Therefore, in order to attain or at least aspire to attain ‘social justice’ in this
policy area, a suitable balance must be struck between these obligations.
To meet demands and provide for the less wealthy individuals in society,
all European states – to a better or worse degree – provide for universal access to
a wide range of medical treatments. This is financed by compulsory collective
insurance (either by taxation or mandatory premiums) through which citizens
insure themselves. Thus, the costs are essentially borne by the citizen. In order to
ensure the delivery of its positive obligation to provide basic health care, the state
must, and in a sense from behind a veil of ignorance, establish certain limitations
on its negative obligation. Limits may be placed on permitting a particular
treatment, on the choice of provider or on the type of treatment one may be
reimbursed for within the state (internal limitation) or outside the state (external
limitation). Certain restrictions are to control costs and to avoid, as far as
possible, any waste of financial, technical, and human resources to ensure
sufficient access to health care within the territory of the state. Throughout the
Union, health care has an almost iconic status as a territorially bound state
commitment. As evidenced below, any ‘creep’ of Europeanization, especially via
‘economic’ rules and contractual autonomy, into this sensitive policy domain
represents a potent challenge.
3.1. Free Movement of Services and Patient Mobility
The EU has only residual competences in the field of health, by virtue of Article
168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This
limited legal basis has allowed for the adoption of support programs and the
delimitation of competence of certain EU bodies and agencies. Although the
Court frequently confirms that the organization and delivery of health care is
the responsibility of the Member State, it is equally acknowledged that where
goods and services are traded, there is scope for EU internal market rules. In
particular, the application of Article 56 TFEU on services and secondary
legislation on social security entitlements for the economically active and their
families39 has been and will continue to be cautiously observed by many national
policymakers and actors.
39 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of 14 Jun. 1971 on the application of social security
schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving
within the Community. This Regulation has been modified at least 30 times, the last important
modification extending its personal scope to cover nationals of non-Member States legally
residing within the EU; see Council Regulation (EC) 859/2003 of 14 May 2003, OJ L 124/1. It
has recently been codified and repealed by Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of 29 Apr. 2004, OJ L
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Early in the 1980s, the Court acknowledged the economic nature of private
health care providers.40 However, the Kohll and Decker rulings of 1998
established for the first time the ‘economic’ dimension of health care that is
provided by statutory reimbursement and social security systems. Despite the
Court recognizing the specific nature of health care (i.e., the need for positive
welfare entitlements to be aggregated and sustained by the national welfare state),
it did not agree to remove it from the ambit of free movement rules. In
subsequent judgments, the Court further clarified that neither the specific type of
statutory cover (be it reimbursement, benefit-in-kind, or national health service)
nor the specific type of health service (hospital or non-hospital) will alter the
economic nature of the health service in question.
Regarding the EU economic freedoms, three different normative
dimensions underlie the individual’s right to health care.41 The first dimension is
the individual’s need for emergency care while abroad. This is rather
uncontroversial and full reimbursement of the costs must be paid by the State of
affiliation (i.e., the state where he is a financial contributor to the insurance fund)
via the European Health Insurance Card.42 The second dimension occurs in
exceptional circumstances, whereby the individual patient cannot receive the
medical treatment his/her condition requires within the State of affiliation. The
third dimension of the individual’s right to health care, and notably the most
controversial with regard to reimbursement, is based purely on patient choice. The
next section will address these latter two dimensions in more detail, given that
they involve ‘planned’ cross-border care and are thus more controversial. All cases
set out below deal with scenarios whereby the patient and a foreign health service
provider have completed an arrangement for certain medical treatment, and the
patient subsequently returns to seek reimbursement for the costs of the said
treatment off his/her home state.
3.2. The Right to Reimbursement for Treatment Abroad out of Medical Need
In Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms,43 two Dutch residents requested reimbursement
from their national insurance funds for the costs of treatment that could not be
166/1. Since all the legislative and judicial developments of the present contribution refer to
Regulation 1408/71, references will be made to this legislative instrument. For an in-depth
analysis of the role of European law and policy on health systems in Europe, see the edited
volume E. MOSIALOSS et al., Health Systems Governance in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2010).
40 See C-286/82 and 26/83 Luisi Carbone [1984] ECR 377 and later C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR
I-4685.
41 See DE WITTE, supra n. 13, p. 74. See also W. PALM & I.A. GLINOS, ‘Enabling Patient Mobility in
the EU: between Free Movement and Coordination’, in E. Mosialoss et al. (eds), Health Systems
Governance in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p. 509.
42 Article 19, Regulation 883/2004.
43 C-157/99 Gereats-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473.
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provided in the Netherlands. Prior authorization for such reimbursement was
subject to the fulfilment of two conditions. First, the treatment must be
sufficiently recognized as ‘normal’ in scientific circles or standards in the
Netherlands. Second, suitable treatment could not be provided in the Netherlands
without undue delay. Mrs Geraets-Smits suffered from Parkinson’s disease and
undertook multidisciplinary treatment in Germany. Her request for
reimbursement of the costs was rejected on the grounds that satisfactory
treatment could be obtained in the Netherlands without undue delay. Mr
Peerboom lapsed into a coma after a traffic accident where he was transferred to
Austria to undertake intensive neuro-stimulation therapy. His reimbursement was
also rejected on the above ground and, furthermore, the therapy in question was
not regarded as ‘normal within the professional circles concerned’ – note,
exclusively circles in the Netherlands. The Court held that the prior authorization
measure that only applied for treatment received abroad constituted a restriction
on the patients’ freedom to receive services (now Art. 56 TFEU). However, it also
held that prior authorization for the assumption of costs for hospital treatment
may indeed be the only reasonable and necessary measure to protect public
health.
The Court then listed a number of overriding reasons that may justify the
restriction – the risk of seriously undermining a social security system, the
attainment of a high level of health protection, and/or the maintenance of
treatment capacity or medical competence on national territory. However, it was
equally recognized that such vital objectives are indeed only that, objectives. They
say nothing about the proportionality of the measure that is in place to secure the
objective. Therefore, it was held that the actual conditions of prior authorization
must not exceed what is necessary for that purpose and that the same result
cannot be achieved by less restrictive rules.44 In order for a prior authorization
scheme to be justified, ‘it must, in any event, be based on objective,
non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in such a way as to
circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities’ discretion, so that it is not
used arbitrarily’.45 Regarding the first condition that the proposed treatment must
be ‘normal’, it was held that any such evaluation must take into account the
findings of international medical science. For the condition concerning ‘suitable
treatment without undue delay’, the national authorities are required to consider
all circumstances of each specific case and to take due account not only of the
patient’s current medical condition but also his/her past medical record.
In Inzian,46 the rather complicated parallel legal route available for
individual patients under EU law was somewhat clarified. This confusion involved
44 Ibid., para. 75.
45 Ibid., para. 90.
46 C-56/01 Inzian [2003] ECR I-12403.
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the relationship between Article 56 TFEU on services and Regulation 1408/71 on
social security coordination, which the Court recognized as symbiotic. The
aforementioned secondary legislation puts in place a coordination mechanism that
gives its beneficiaries the right to receive sickness benefits in kind in a state other
than the one in which they are insured. These benefits are provided in accordance
with the legislation of the providing state, as if the person concerned was insured
there, at the expense of the state of affiliation. Thus, the state in which the
individual contributes to the social security scheme must cover the costs. Note
that although the said state pays for the treatment, it also retains control over
whether to authorize it (now Art. 20(1) of Regulation 883/2004). This ‘control’ is
not unlimited. Authorization may not be refused when the treatment is (i) covered
by the health system in the state of affiliation and (ii) cannot be given to the
patient within a medically justifiable time limit. The patient may rely directly on
these provisions by requesting an E 112 form to travel abroad for such treatment.
Alternatively, the patient may rely on the Treaty-based legal route. The freedom
to receive medical services does not preclude prior authorization either but
equally subjects the granting of that authorization to the condition that the
patient could not receive appropriate treatment (included in the national benefit
package) to his or her condition without undue delay in the state of affiliation.
Essentially, the two routes do not contradict each other; however, there are
greater benefits for relying upon Regulation 883/2004. This route guarantees the
patient full reimbursement of the costs, and he does not have to pay in advance to
fall within the material scope of the Treaty-based freedoms.
In Watts,47 a UK national suffered from arthritis of the hip. After the
diagnosis was made, she had to wait for over a year before such treatment could
be offered within the United Kingdom, leaving her mobility severely hampered
and in constant pain.48 She had been denied approval for an E 112 form on two
occasions and subsequently travelled to France to receive the treatment, at her
own costs, substantially sooner (where she was treated in less than one month).
The English High Court acknowledged that due to her condition, she was
wrongfully refused an E 112 when she applied the first time and should not have
been initially put on a 12-month waiting list. However, it continued to opine that
as she was reassessed six months after that decision, and her waiting time was
corrected to only four months from that second decision onwards, then she could
not claim the treatment was unduly delayed.
On the one hand, it held that a 12-month waiting period was unacceptable
given Ms Watts’ condition and that she should have been treated within four
months. On the other hand, two separate waiting periods (the six months before
the reassessment and the four after), totalling a ten-month period of ‘severe pain’,
47 C-327/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325.
48 Ibid., para. 24.
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were deemed to be acceptable. Essentially, the English Court held that as the
relevant national authority got it right the second time (two months too late,
followed by a further four-month waiting period), Ms Watts could not claim the
delay was ‘undue’. The CJEU entertained no such claims and restated that any
conditions for prior authorization (in casu, waiting lists) must not exceed an
acceptable period on the basis of an objective medical assessment of the
individual’s clinical needs, in light of all factors characterizing his/her medical
condition. This obligation cannot be avoided purely because the claimant was
wrongfully refused an E 112 on the first time of asking.
Arguably, in elaborating the conditions under which patients are allowed to
seek treatment abroad to compensate for the failures of their own state’s medical
system, the Court is seeking to prevent instances that constitute a violation of the
citizens’ fundamental right to access safe and high-quality health care. Such
intentions are potently evident in the more recent Elchinov49 decision. A
Bulgarian national covered by (and contributing to) the national health insurance
fund of his home state was diagnosed with a malignant oncological disease (a
cancer) of the right eye. On the advice of his doctor, the patient travelled to
Berlin in order to obtain specialized treatment that was not available in Bulgaria.
Indeed, it was acknowledged that the only actual treatment available in Bulgaria
was the removal of the eye. Thus, he applied to the national fund to cover the
costs for treatment in a highly specialized clinic in Berlin. In light of the pressing
circumstances, he travelled abroad without waiting to receive authorization from
the national authorities. Upon returning to Bulgaria (with two eyes and complete
eyesight intact after successful treatment in Berlin), Mr Elchinov sought
reimbursement for the costs. His application was rejected on the grounds that the
‘treatment was not one of the benefits provided for by Bulgarian legislation.’ On
appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, it was held that such a refusal was in
accordance with Regulation 1408/71 as the treatment in question was an
advanced therapy not available and thus not covered by the national health
insurance in Bulgaria. Indeed, the exact type of treatment (attachments of
radioactive applicators or proton therapy) was not included in the list of national
benefits.
However, Bulgarian law did provide for a general set of clinical treatments,
which the latter may indeed fall within, such as ‘other operations on the eyeball’
and ‘high-technology radiotherapy for oncological conditions’. In respect to this
issue, the Court has already held that it is not, in principle, incompatible with EU
law for a Member State to establish exhaustive lists of the medical benefits
reimbursed under its social security scheme and that that right cannot have the
49 C-173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I-08889.
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effect of requiring a Member State to extend such lists of medical benefits.50
Nonetheless, it held that in deciding whether a particular treatment is included in
the national benefits, if the legislation does not expressly and precisely stipulate
the method of treatment applied (and cannot offer alternatively effective
treatment with undue delay), the national authorities must apply the usual
principles of interpretation to the relevant general categories of treatment listed
on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory criteria. This must take into
account the pathological condition of the patient, including the nature of the
disease and the degree of pain. The national authorities cannot presume that
specific treatment is not included in the list of national benefits simply because it
is not available in that territory. Hence, Member States have to reimburse
treatment considered vital for the patient’s physical integrity and which is
generally included in the national benefits but cannot be provided at home.
Before moving onto an analysis of the effects these decisions have on the
attainment of ‘social justice’ in health care, an even more controversial patients’
rights claim based solely on normative preference must be examined.
3.3. The Right to Reimbursement for Treatment Received Abroad out of Choice
In Kohll,51 a doctor from and based in Luxembourg preferred for his daughter to
get orthodontic braces across the border in Trier, Germany. His request for
reimbursement of the costs incurred was rejected ‘on the grounds that the
proposed treatment was not urgent and that it could be provided in Luxembourg’.
Although this did not mean Mr Kohll was prohibited from approaching an
orthodontist in Germany, it did mean, as the provider was not established in
Luxembourg, that he would have to cover the costs himself. Having accepted that
this may indeed deter one to avail of the service abroad, the Court deemed it a
restriction to free movement and subjected it to justification. The public interest
behind such restriction is to provide a balanced medical and hospital service
accessible to all within the state. Six Member State governments observed that
prior authorization constitutes the only effective and least restrictive mean of
controlling expenditure on health and balancing the budget of the social security
system.
The Court accepted that a measure to exclude the risk of seriously
undermining the financial balance of the social security system would be
permitted in the public interest. Nonetheless, under European free movement
rules, such a restriction must be objectively justified. This means that the actual
conditions of the prior authorization in question must be effective and necessary
in controlling expenditure on health. It must be proven that claims such as Mr
50 See, to that effect, Gereats-Smits and Peerbooms, supra n. 43, para. 87.
51 C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931.
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Kohll’s have significant effects on the financing of the national system. Mr Kohll
argued that the financial burden on Luxembourg’s social security system is
non-existent, both in principle and in practice, since he is an ‘insured person’
under the Luxembourg union of health insurance and the medical expenses are
requested at the same rate as applied in Luxembourg. Thus, reimbursement in
accordance with the tariff of the state of insurance could not lead to higher
financial burdens, since the treatment (provided at home or abroad) would have
to be refunded to the exact same amount regardless (which is, in any case, set by
the home state). Given that no authorization was required for the same treatment
provided at home, the rule in question could not be justified by the need to
control health expenditure.
In Muller-Fauré and Van Riet,52 the Court again acknowledged that the
right to seek health care abroad out of choice based on Article 56 TFEU may be
restricted by prior authorization justified on grounds of public health. However, a
measure that is not based on fear of wastage resulting from hospital overcapacity
but solely on the ground that there are waiting lists on the national territory for
the hospital treatment concerned, without account being taken of the specific
circumstances attached to the patient’s medical condition, cannot amount to a
properly justified restriction on freedom to provide services.53 In any case, this
right to seek health care abroad at no point allows for full reimbursement of the
costs but only up to the level that would have been granted had the treatment
taken place at ‘home’.
The recently adopted Directive on patients’ rights in cross-border health
care (‘PRD’)54 largely codifies the Courts’ attempts, outlined above, to secure a
type of solidarity in protecting the patients’ right to choose. Such freedom may
only be limited to protect access to high-quality health care in the state of
affiliation and the patient in any case will only be reimbursed up to the costs of
equivalent treatment in the state of affiliation. The next section will contain a
critical analysis of all the above decisions in light of the broader objective of this
study.
3.4. Reflections on the Judicial Interpretation of the Economic Freedoms and
‘Social Justice’ in Health Care across Europe
Do the above decisions, addressed in sections 3.2 and 3.3, represent European
judicial activism disabling the state’s capacity to provide for basic health care? Or,
are they in accordance with the broad objectives of ‘social justice’?
First, all of the aforementioned decisions evidence the Court’s preference
for normative individualism. It has ruled in a mantra-like fashion that any
52 C-385/99 Muller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509.
53 Ibid., paras 90, 92, and 109.
54 Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care.
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restriction on the patient’s contractual freedom to receive a medical service, such
as the conditions on prior authorization, must take into account the directly
concerned individual’s medical needs. In Watts and Elchinov, the Court has used
the economic freedoms and the relevant secondary legislation to compensate for
the failures of national health systems and entitle the patient to seek the required
treatment abroad. The demand for ‘undue delay’ and ‘effective treatment’ have
granted the individual a right to adequate care whenever a treatment option can
be construed to fall within the ‘basket of health care’ in the state of affiliation but
cannot be provided in its territory. This situation arises only in extreme and
exceptional circumstances. Eurostat data suggests that the unmet need of health
care is very limited within the EU.55 Furthermore, there is evidence that this line
of case law has managed to partially help Member States meet their positive
obligation (i.e., provide for basic health care). Empirical research shows that
Member States have used the rationale behind these decisions to compensate for
the lack of financial and technological resources required to treat rare diseases56
or to balance negative externalities between the supply and demand of health care
at the border regions.57
As for the decisions in Kohll and Muller-Fauré concerning the receipt of
medical services as an expression of patient choice, national governments brought
forward two general arguments premised upon their positive obligation to protect
immobile citizens. One argument is based on the infrastructural stability of the
health care system of affiliation, while the other relates to the financial stability of
the said system.
55 See Table 8.1, Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-Border Healthcare,
SEC (2008) 2163, p. 68.
56 As noted by DE WITTE, supra n. 13, p. 95, ‘Malta and Luxemburg, for example, simply outsource
treatment of such patients to other systems, which frees up resources for other treatments.
Likewise, it allows less rich Member States to offer treatment options that are (for the moment)
unavailable at home’. See also Opinion of AG Villalón in Elchinov [2010], para. 72: ‘a system
such as the Bulgarian system, which seeks to offer a very advanced list of treatment that is paid
for by the fund, benefits from the knowledge and technology of other Member States which have
the technical resources to which Bulgaria aspires. If a Member State wishes to be at the cutting
edge of medical treatment (which naturally takes time), European Union law allows its citizens to
receive in another Member State treatment which the former State wishes to make available
domestically, although not at present in a position to do so’.
57 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163,
p. 42: ‘Belgium has had larger patient flows for planned care than most other Member States, in
particular with Dutch patients being treated in Flanders through contracts between Dutch health
insurers and Belgian providers. In this case study, the researchers consider that as well as being
convenient for patients, this is more efficient for both the Dutch insurers (providing care that is
faster and cheaper, as well as being perceived as technologically advanced and of high quality)
and the Belgian providers (helping to overcome overcapacity in the acute hospital sector by
treating patients from abroad)’.
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The infrastructural argument assumes that increased patient mobility will
result in a waste of resources and cutbacks in cost-intensive treatments, leaving
‘immobile’ patients in the state of affiliation worse off.58 This is a legitimate
concern, but in order to be a justified exception to free movement rules, it must
be objectively and empirically demonstrated. Indeed, this may be difficult, but a
fair assessment can ultimately be based on the number of mobile patients. The
Commission recently estimated that only 1% of the total Gross Domestic Prodcuct
of the EU is spent on cross-border health care, as the number of cross-border
patients remains extremely low. In context, approximately EUR 9.7 billion of a
total EUR 12,149 billion is spent on such health care.59
The second argument regarding financial stability assumes that patient
mobility will destabilize access to adequate treatment for all citizens by producing
financial asymmetries. First, this argument is conceptually flawed. The Court has
reiterated on numerous occasions that in the case of patients who choose
treatment abroad, the Member State of affiliation is only required to reimburse
costs up to the same amount had the treatment taken place in its territory. Any
costs above this threshold are borne by the patient. Thus, as the patient
contributes to the funding of the collective insurance scheme and becomes a
beneficiary of that scheme at no extra costs, there can be no logical reasoning to
assume that the financial stability of the health care system is suddenly under
threat. Second, there is no empirical evidence as of yet that the financial stability
of national distributive choices has been negatively affected. National actors argue
that financial instability may be difficult to prove until it is too late; they fear a
drop may become a flood. However, as it stands, there exists empirical evidence
to the contrary – the number of cross-border patients is extremely low and
moderate estimates suggest that patient mobility is financially advantageous for
the Member States.60 This goes someway to explaining the difficulty in identifying
the adverse effects repeatedly warned by such national actors. Indeed, a drop may
become a flood in the future, but without signs of becoming even a stream such
arguments appear nothing more than hyped speculation.
Essentially, the economic freedoms have protected the individual right to
receive adequate health care free from unjustifiable restrictions, without so far
58 See DE WITTE, supra n. 13, p. 97.
59 In a national context, between 2001 and 2006, the United Kingdom spent approximately GBP 2
billion on cross-border care, while during that same period it spent an estimated GBP 4 billion on
overpaid benefits due to official mistakes. See E. VAN GINNEKEN & R. BUSSE, ‘Cross-Border Health
Care Data’, in M. Wissmaer, W. Palm et al. (eds), Cross-Border Health Care in the EU: Mapping
and Analyzing Practices and Policies,Observatory Studies Series (2008), p. 310; and see annual
rates regarding Estimates of Fraud and Error Levels in the Benefit System in Great Britain,
National Statistics by the Department of Work and Pensions, UK government publications. See
www.gov.uk/government/publications.
60 See Commission Impact Assessment, supra n. 57, pp. 34 and 55.
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disrupting the positive obligation to ensure a universally accessible health system.
Note that the Court has also refrained from imposing any positive obligations
upon the Member States. National policymakers retain the regulatory autonomy to
decide whether or not to reimburse particular costs for treatment. However, if
they decide to offer reimbursement for certain treatment within the state of
affiliation, they cannot deny reimbursement should that treatment be provided
outside the state of affiliation.61 The above decisions on health care and the
economic freedoms demonstrate that the Court has aided, by utilizing financial
and technological resources, the balance between the negative and positive
obligations of social justice in this area.
4. Education
In accordance with the above conception of ‘social justice’, the delivery of
education, just like health care, entails a double obligation. On the one hand, it is
a vital human entitlement that must be equally available to each individual. Here
we see the positive obligation on the State. It links the individual to general
societal development, generating across the board welfare and human well-being.
On the other hand, it develops the individual’s identity and self-determination,
enabling him/her to pursue his/her normative preferences. Hence, there also
exists a negative obligation to ensure that such individual desires remain free
from disproportionate interference.
In the field of education, there may be limitations on the choices that the
provider and the recipient of education services can make, limitations on who can
run schools (public or private), limitations on who receives the award of study
grants, and so on. Such measures reflect the state’s interest in maintaining the
continuity, universality, and high quality of education services within the
territory. Thus, in order to ensure the delivery of its positive obligation, the state
must impose certain limitations upon its negative obligation. In this regard, we
can identify three general individual claims to education: (i) the right to access
compulsory education (primary and secondary levels), (ii) the right to access
tertiary education, and (iii) the right to receive education-related financial
assistance.
Although the Union has very limited competence in the sphere of
education, this does not mean that the Member States retain full autonomy over
the structure of their education policies. As with health-care policies, the effects
of European ‘economic’ rules on the attainment of ‘social justice’ in national
education policies are not uncontroversial. In this regard, brief attention will also
be paid to the role played by non-economically active migrants, namely tertiary
students.
61 Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, para. 48.
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4.1. Education and Economically Active Migrants
Up until the 1960s, Member States retained complete autonomy in deciding
whether, and under which conditions, to grant migrant workers access to their
educational facilities.62 However, the introduction of Regulation 1612/68,63 to
ensure the worker is guaranteed the possibility of improving his living and
working conditions and promoting his social advancement, requires equal
treatment of economically active migrants and national workers with regard to
‘social and tax advantages’. This explicitly includes educational benefits, both for
the worker (Art. 7(3)) and for his/her family members (Art. 12). Part of this
Regulation (Art. 10 and Art. 11) was amended by Directive 2004/38, which
contains a general and unconditional equal treatment clause for migrant workers
and their family members. Combined, these provisions grant such persons equal
access to the three general individual rights listed above, access to compulsory
education, access to tertiary education, and access to related financial benefits. A
migrant worker and his children acquire these social entitlements to education
from the moment the worker starts his employment. Thus, in all cases discussed
in this section, once an EU citizen has exercised his/her contractual autonomy to
enter into an employment agreement in the host state, the public law rules in that
host state must non-discriminately protect that worker and his/her children
accordingly.
In Casagrande,64 the aforementioned secondary legislation was held not
only to allow migrant children access to education but also all related study grants
to which the child of a national worker is entitled. This was a clear teleological
interpretation of the rules in order to ‘enable such children to attend these
courses under the best possible conditions’. In Echternach and Moritz,65 two
migrant children were refused study grants in the Netherlands. In the first case,
the child of a German migrant worker, who had received his entire primary and
secondary education in the Netherlands, sought a study grant to continue his
studies there. At that time, his father had ceased working in the Netherlands and
the whole family returned to Germany. Due to a refusal by the German authorities
to recognize his Dutch diplomas, the child returned to the Netherlands only to
find that his claim for a grant to study there had been rejected. The Dutch
authorities refused his application on the grounds that he no longer retained the
status of a family member of a worker under Regulation 1612/68. However, the
Court rejected this reasoning and stated that the child must be considered to
62 A.P. VAN DER MEI, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community (Oxford: Hart,
2003), p. 347.
63 This was recently codified by Regulation 492/2011 on Freedom of Movements of Workers within
the Union.
64 Case 9/74 Casagrande [1974] ECR 773.
65 Cases 389-390/87 Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723.
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retain the status of a ‘worker’s child’ (and therefore receive the grant) in order to
protect his integration into the society. It refused to allow the child to suffer
adverse consequences (no further education in the host state or the home state),
solely because his father, who was a net contributor to the host state’s taxation
system, had returned to his home state. In the second case, the Court precluded
the Dutch authorities of evading the obligation to grant equal study benefits to
the child of a worker, merely because his father occupied a post governed by
special statute under international law (regarding the European Space Agency). In
such a case, the child is deemed to fall within the ambit of the Regulation.
In Di Leo,66 the daughter of an Italian migrant worker, who was employed
in Germany for over 18 years, had been refused a study grant for pursuing a
course outside of Germany. This was due to German rules that stated that the
grant applied for was only to be awarded to either German citizens or EU citizens
who were not seeking to use it in their country of origin. As she sought to study
medicine in Siena, her application was refused. The Court rejected this and stated
that if the host State decides to offer a grant to pursue studies abroad to its own
nationals, the children of a migrant worker should benefit from the same
advantage, even if the courses are in his/her state of origin.
The well-known Baumbast67 case involved two decisions given by the
United Kingdom (UK) Immigration Tribunal refusing residence permits for the
parents of children who fell within the scope of Regulation 1612/68. Mr
Baumbast was a German national who had been working on and off for a period of
five years in the UK. He moved there in 1990 with his Colombian wife and two
children (who are dual Colombian and German citizens), and the whole family
subsequently received five-year residence permits. In 1996, the application to
extend their permits was refused. On appeal, Mrs Baumbast was granted leave to
stay until her children finished education. Mr Baumbast’s application, however,
was not overturned by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The second claimant in
this case, Mrs R, was a US citizen who moved to the UK with two children as the
spouse of an EU worker exercising his free movement. She was granted a five-year
residence permit. Two years after arriving however, she got divorced, but the
father continued to live nearby in the UK and play a prominent role in the
children’s lives. Most relevantly for this part of the analysis, both children were
enrolled in education. Having reapplied for an extension after five years, her
application was refused as the Secretary of State was not satisfied that the family
situation was so exceptional to justify the exercise of his discretion. In his view,
‘the children were young enough to adapt to life in the United States if they had
to accompany their mother there’.
66 C-308/89 Di Leo [1990] ECR I-4185.
67 C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091.
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In both cases, the claimants invoked their rights under Regulation
1612/68 and also Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) on the right to family life. The Court held that the child of a migrant
worker is entitled to reside in the host state in order for the child to attend
general education courses even if the parents get divorced and/or the only parent
who had qualified as a migrant worker had ceased his/her economic activity. The
Court explicitly referred to the ‘spirit’ of the Regulation, which is to facilitate the
workers’ family from a ‘human point of view’ in compliance with the principles of
‘liberty’ and ‘dignity’. Furthermore, the Court explicitly confirmed that
Regulation 1612/68 must be read in light of the fundamental right to private and
family life (Art. 8 ECHR). Thus, Article 12 of the said secondary legislation
implies that children ‘installed’ in the host state are to be accompanied by the
primary carer and that person is able to reside in the host state in order for the
child to complete his education successfully.
The recent ruling in Teixeria68 further highlights the individualist stance
taken by the Court with regard to the child’s right to education under Regulation
1612/68. Ms Texiera was a Portuguese national who moved to the UK as the
spouse of a migrant worker. Her daughter was born in the UK and spent her
entire education there. For over 14 years, she worked various jobs, but after
getting divorced and falling unemployed, she subsequently sought state housing
benefits for the homeless. This was rejected as she had not been authorized a
residence permit (a precondition for such benefits). The Court reiterated its
stance in Baumbast that the above-mentioned Regulation is designed to ensure
the child of a migrant worker pursue his education in the host state under the
‘best possible’ conditions and to be accompanied by his primary carer. This right
is acquired once the child is ‘installed’ in that state (i.e., has started his/her
education) and does not cease merely if his/her parent becomes economically
inactive. Moreover, it was held that such a right could not be dependent on
having adequate sickness insurance or sufficient resources not to become a
burden on the state.69
4.2. Education and Non-economically Active Migrants
As the focus of this article is on claims made against the Court’s interpretation of
the economic freedoms, this section will only briefly touch upon the role of
non-economically active migrants (specifically, students who travel abroad purely
to seek tertiary education). Each of the cases below involves a scenario whereby a
student has exercised his contractual autonomy to enter into an agreement to
attend a particular third level educational institution. Given that the relevant
68 C-480/08 Teixeira [2011] ECR I-1107.
69 These are the conditions laid out in Art. 7(3) Directive 2004/38 in order for economically
inactive citizens to acquire a right of residence beyond three months.
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decisions here were premised upon the principle of non-discrimination and the
concept of citizenship,70 they cannot be accused of abusing the economic
provisions in the strict sense. Nonetheless, hardened EU opponents may subscribe
to the view that citizenship and non-discrimination are applied by the CJEU in
such scenarios only to enhance market efficiency and comparative advantage
(perhaps in support of effet neoliberal claims). Indeed, claims that the internal
market serves as a strong conceptual foundation of EU citizenship are correct.
This however, as evidenced by Wollenschläger and Kostakopoulou, does not de
facto imply that economic motives must always lie at the heart of European
citizenship and non-discrimination. The Court has made this clear. A highly
educated European polity is not just crucial for a leading competitive market but
indeed crucial for basic well-being throughout the Union. Why should one assume
that the Court’s view of the latter objective is entirely overshadowed by its desire
for the former? In the relevant student mobility decisions, not only has the Court
refused to label economic integration as an end within itself but also explicitly
rules out the need to rely on the economic provisions as a legal means.71
Regardless, a brief outline of the decisions will be given below, which highlight
the grant of two types of education rights for non-economically active migrants:
(i) access to tertiary studies and (ii) related financial assistance, from either the
home state or the host state. This will be followed by a critical analysis of the said
decisions.
4.2.1. Access to Tertiary Education
Almost 30 years ago in the Gravier and Blaziot72 decisions, the Court held that
students who move to another Member State to gain access to the education
system must be treated in the same way as national students with regard to the
imposition of registration fees. This was explicitly to allow students to find the
‘specialised subject desired in order to develop their particular talents’. In
70 For an excellent overview of the legal debate on European citizenship, see D. KOCHENOV, ‘The
Present and Future of EU Citizenship: A Bird’s Eye View of the Legal Debate’, 2(12). Jean
Monnet Working Papers: NYU Law School 2012, whereby Kochenov correctly states: ‘The ECJ
has made it absolutely clear that EU citizenship does not per se have market-oriented aims and
also plays an important role in the lives of those who are not economically active in the context of
the Internal Market. The mainstream approach in the literature, which is fully supported by ECJ
case-law and secondary EU law instruments consists in characterizing EU citizenship as a
Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, or lying out with the immediate confines of the single market’.
71 Note that in Case C-76/05 Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, the Court held that Art. 56 could be
deemed relevant provided the school was privately funded. This perhaps raises a host of problems
in itself, but the Court went on to state that EU rules on citizenship and non-discrimination apply
regardless of whether an economic freedom was found to be at play.
72 C-294/83 Gravier [1985] ECR I-00593.
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Commission v. Austria73 and Bressol,74 the Court was forced to address the
legitimacy of quota systems on the number of non-resident students allowed to
enter certain degree courses (i.e., subjecting foreign students to extra entrance
requirements). It was acknowledged that allowing foreign nationals equal access
to tertiary education must not result in a situation whereby a Member State can
no longer sustain normative commitments vis-à-vis its own citizens – either due to
excessive burden on public finances, jeopardizing the quality of education, or a
national shortage of certain vital professions, in casu, medics. However, the Court
once again deemed that any measure to tackle these concerns must be appropriate
and necessary in achieving its objective. The national court must assess if such
risks are genuine based on ‘objective, detailed analysis, supported by figures’. If
such evidence is produced, then a limitation on Article 18 TFEU
(non-discrimination) and Article 21 TFEU (free movement) may be justified.
These judgments will be critically analysed below (s. 4.3).
4.2.2. Access to Related Financial Assistance
A few years following the Gravier decision, the Court stipulated in the Lair75 case
that students coming to the host state purely for education are entitled to equal
access to study grants that cover tuition fees but not those meant to cover
maintenance costs. In Forster,76 the Court realigned its previous case law77 with
Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38. This declares that the host state is not
required to grant equal treatment to maintenance costs for EU citizens who have
not been resident in that state for at least a period of five years. This was deemed
by the Union legislator to be a valid time period to prove suitable ties of
reciprocity between the beneficiary student and the state.
The issue of exporting study grants (i.e., from the student’s state of
affiliation) came to the fore in the Schwarz78 and Morgan and Bucher79 decisions.
The former case concerned a German rule that granted tax relief for costs
incurred by parents sending their children to private schools within the territory
of the state but not for those outside the state. The latter case concerned another
German rule that narrowly restricted the granting of maintenance support to
students who attend an establishment outside the state. The Court found that the
German rules were contrary to the principle of non-discrimination (Art. 18 TFEU)
and free movement as laid out in Article 21 TFEU, as it disadvantaged nationals
73 C-147/03 Commission v. Austria [2005] ECR I-5969.
74 C-73/08 Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735.
75 C-39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3162.
76 C-158/07 Forster [2008] ECR I-8507.
77 See C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119.
78 See supra n. 71.
79 Joined Cases C 11/05 and C-11/06 Morgan and Bucher [2006].
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who availed of their mobility rights. Thus, education-related benefits provided
within the State must also be exportable for education sought abroad. Note that
such benefits must only be up to the amount offered within the national (home
state) context.
4.3. Reflections on the Judicial Interpretation of the Economic Freedoms and
‘Social Justice’ in Education across Europe
Regarding the decisions on migrant workers’ children, it is clear that when the
Court is looking at restrictions on Article 45 TFEU and Regulation 1612/68 –
granting access to (and funding for) education – it has placed the child’s interest
at the centre of justification. When a family migrates and subsequently installs
(i.e., the parent engages in an economic activity and the child begins education)
in the host state, that child is entitled to equal opportunity to complete his studies
in that state. Essentially, the migrant may only become a beneficiary of
education-related entitlements once he/she becomes economically active, so in
most instances80 he/she will also be a net contributor to the financing of that very
system. It may be said this ‘intrusion’ of EU economic law is largely premised
upon a pragmatic form of market-based solidarity. Furthermore, the economic
rules offered the litigants in question a genuine means of objective judicial review
– where individual protection is not a narrow exception.
Indeed, the Court must ensure not to overstretch this approach and
damage distributive education policies on the national level. Member State
governments frequently argued that the education system may become overloaded
due to responsibilities to ensure the migrant worker has equal treatment – both to
access education and to related financial benefits. In turn, this reduces the
capacity to ensure nationals within the host state territory access to high-quality
education. Admittedly, it is difficult to prove the existence of such negative
externalities. However, indirect measures do provide some insights.
Eurostat data show that less than 1% of EU citizens are settling in a new
country of residence each year. Within this group,81 trends show that the
employment rate is quite high – thus, the number of migrants who are net
contributors to the funding of the host state education system is quite high. In
addition, the percentage of migrants (including ‘post accession’ migrants) seeking
state benefits is extremely low.82 For example in the United Kingdom, one of the
80 Of course, exceptions to this arise, as seen in the case law, if the migrant ceases the economic
activity but his/her children, who are ‘installed’ in the host state, retain their status as a family
member of a worker under Regulation 1612/68.
81 See Eurostat estimations on population and social conditions available at www.ec.europa.
eu/eurostat.
82 2013 Commission Report: A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States’ social
security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory
754
largest receivers of EU immigrants, the records show that approximately 84% are
employed, while 2.4% rely on some form of social benefits (including those
granted for education).83
As for the non-economically active migrants (namely tertiary students), the
Court recognized the fundamental difference between access to financial aid to
cover the costs of education in another Member State (Bidar) and access to a
particular course in the education system itself (Bressol).
In a Bidar-like scenario, the costs are shared between the host sate and the
home state, based on the reciprocal ties the student has with the respective states.
The host state may only be required to pay once the student in question has been
resident in the said state for a minimum period of five years – a period approved
by the European legislator. Furthermore, grants or benefits available in the home
state to help students attending an institute in that state must equally be available
to students who choose to attend an institute based abroad. The export costs in
this scenario are no higher or lower had the student chosen to stay in the home
state to study – meaning no increasing demand is put upon the public fund and
space is freed up in the home state for the course in question.
A Bressol-like scenario – regarding non-discriminatory access to particular
courses – is more controversial. The first concern here is the risk of placing an
excessive burden on public finances. Students who move abroad to study reap the
benefits from publicly funded education in the host state but do not contribute to
financing it through national taxes nor do they necessarily ‘pay back’ by staying to
work in the host state and become taxpayers there. In response to this, Advocate
General (AG) Sharpston,84 Jacobs,85 and Geelhoed86 note that students do provide
some source of income for local economies where the university is located and
also, to a limited extent, for national treasuries via indirect taxes. Moreover, in
Bressol, the Belgian Government explicitly submitted that the objective of the
decree in question (limiting access to non-resident students) was ‘not of a
financial nature’87 – but rather to tackle the ‘perverse effects of absolute mobility
on the quality of education’, especially in regard to medical-related courses.
In response to arguments of ‘overcrowded classrooms’ and lack of qualified
medics remaining to work in the host state, neither the Belgian nor Austrian
Government had figures available showing the number of non-resident students
cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence – DG Employment, Social Affairs
and Inclusion via DG Justice Framework Contract – Final report submitted by ICF GHK in
association with Milieu Ltd., 14 Oct. 2013 (revised on 16 Dec. 2013).
83 N. POLLARD et al., Floodgates or Turnstiles? Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from)
the UK, (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2008).
84 Opinion of AG Sharpston on C-73/08 Bressol, para. 96.
85 Opinion of AG Jacobs on C-147/03 Commission v. Austria, para. 33.
86 Opinion of AG Geelhoed on C 212/05 Bidar, para. 65.
87 Supra n. 74, para. 98.
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enrolled in the courses at issue before the adoption of the respective quotas.
Indeed, it may not be said therefore that national governments must wait
passively until significant damage is done to the higher education system.
However, as AG Sharpston88 alludes to: the specific material that would ‘lead a
prudent legislator legitimately to conclude that a burgeoning problem needed to
be nipped in the bud’ simply did not exist before the respective decrees were
enacted. Moreover, to this day, such specific material remains non-existent.
This, of course, does not mean that a serious threat to the quality of
education or health care may not arise, but it does mean, according to the Court,
that strict evidence-based requirements of such a threat must be satisfied. In
December 2012, the Commission increased its suspension period of infringement
action against Austria and Belgium until 2016,89 in order to acquire such
evidence and to explore policy options that would reduce overcrowding and
possible shortages of qualified personnel. Hence, it is accepted that restrictions
may be permissible should the Member State provide clear evidence that the
education services provided to its own nationals are directly and adversely
affected. Until this is proven, any measure to protect the quality of education or
quantity of health personnel must be proportionate and non-discriminatory, not
just speculatively precautionary.
It must also be noted that Belgium and Austria (as said governments
argued) are not uniquely susceptible to the threat of ‘overcrowding’ in specific
courses. According to OECD statistics,90 in 2011, Belgium had 51,572
non-citizen students out of a total population of 11,047,740 (a ratio of 1:214),
and Austria had 70,558 non-citizen students out of a total population of
8,406,186 (a ratio of 1:119). By comparison, Denmark has a ratio of 1:188,
Sweden has a ratio of 1:180, Ireland has a ratio of 1:193, and the United Kingdom
has a ratio of 1:109. Not only do these figures show that ‘education tourism’ is at
play in other nations, but that the overall influx of foreign students and the
immanent risk to host state education systems also remain similarly and notably
low across Europe.
In sum, the Court has ensured (i) the right for a migrant worker’s child to
enter and remain in education in the host state once he/she is installed (and thus
acquire equal access to related benefits), (ii) the non-discriminatory right to
access tertiary education abroad (pending strong evidence that this is detrimental
to the host state in question), and (iii) that any maintenance costs for tertiary
88 AG Sharpston, supra n. 84, para. 711.
89 In 2008, Austria and Belgium had established monitoring systems and conducted forecast studies
on supply and demand for medical personnel.
90 UNESCO-OECD-Eurostat (UOE) data collection on education statistics, compiled on the basis of
national administrative sources, reported by Ministries of Education or National Statistical
Offices. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RFOREIGN.
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education are shared between the host state and the home state dependant on ties
of reciprocity the student has with the respective states. Any fears of a CJEU
neo-liberal agenda, supporting private autonomy to the detriment of Member
State education policies, are largely unfounded.
5. Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Human Rights
This section will look at the specific instances in which the economic freedoms
have come into play with fundamental rights and how these decisions reflect
against the normative yardstick of ‘social justice’91 outlined in section 2 above.
The essential question is once again: was the right balance struck?
Fundamental ‘human’ rights were not mentioned in the original treaties
and only came into the realm of EU law when the CJEU announced them as
‘general principles’ in 1969.92 Today, Article 6 TEU underlines the important
status fundamental rights have gained in EU law by stating that the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR) shall have the same legal value as the Treaty. This
means they are now formally binding and can be used to challenge both EU and
Member State actions. As the core concern of this article regards the Court’s
interpretation of specific economic mobility provisions and national conceptions
of the ‘public good’, this section will focus on situations when Member States and
powerful non-state actors interfere with the aforementioned freedoms.93 There are
two general types of cases that arise in this scenario: (i) cases whereby the
interference with economic mobility infringes fundamental rights – i.e., EU law
acts as a ‘shield’ for fundamental rights, and (ii) cases whereby the interference
with economic mobility is for the protection of fundamental rights – EU law acts
as a ‘sword’.
91 For an excellent analysis on the interaction between private law rules, fundamental Treaty
freedoms, and fundamental rights in the EU, see both CHEREDNYCHENKO, 1. ERPL 2006,
pp. 23–61 and COLOMBI CIACCHI, supra n. 13. For a comprehensive analysis of a comparison
comparative analysis of the impact of fundamental rights on contractual relationships in
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and England, see C. MAK, Fundamental Rights in European
Contract Law (Kluwer, 2008).
92 C-26/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419.
93 In ERT, it was held that when Member States derogate from EU rules, they are considered to be
‘acting within the scope’ of EU law and, as such, obliged to respect fundamental rights. Note that
there arguably exists a self-standing obligation to respect fundamental rights (see Case C-71/02
Karner and Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci); however, this will not be discussed here. For an
excellent discussion on this, see DE VRIES, p. 12.
757
5.1. Interference with Economic Mobility that also Infringes Fundamental
Rights
Cases such as ERT,94 Baumbast,95 and Carpenter96 are all examples of when the
fundamental freedoms have acted as a repository for fundamental rights. In ERT,
the Court held that in order for a national statute granting one company exclusive
television and radio rights to be considered a justified restriction on the free
movement of services, it must be appraised in the light of Article 10 ECHR on the
freedom of expression. In Baumbast, described in more detail in the section
above, the free movement of workers and relevant secondary legislation were used
as a tool in order to keep the family unit in the one territory (Art. 8 ECHR). In
Carpenter, the Court found that deportation of Mrs Carpenter, and the
consequent separation between husband and wife would be detrimental to their
family life (again Art. 8 ECHR) and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr
Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom (see para. 39). Here, it may well be
argued that the protection of the right to family life is not strictly necessary to the
provision or receipt of services. Indeed, Mr Carpenter was providing advertising
space to customers in other Member States before he met his wife. As noted by
Chalmers, to truly understand the Court’s reasoning in the above decisions, we
must interpret the ‘economic’ freedoms as part of a ‘wider panoply of
socio-economic entitlements and human rights to which all EU citizens should be
entitled’.97
5.2. Reliance on Fundamental Rights to Justify Interference with Economic
Mobility
As de Vries aptly points out, the Schmidberger98 case is somewhat of a locus
classicus for conflicting rights in EU law.99 The facts of the case involved an
environmental demonstration on a motorway, which disrupted the flow of goods
from Italy to Austria. The protest took place on a single route, on a single
occasion, and during a limited period. The Court recognized that ‘whilst the free
movement of goods constitutes one of the fundamental principles in the scheme
of the Treaty, it may in certain circumstances be subject to restrictions’ (para.
78). Equally, it was held that the right to freedom of expression and assembly may
be limited by the economic freedoms. Due to the proportionate manner in which
94 C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I 2925.
95 See supra n. 67.
96 C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I 6279.
97 See D. CHALMERS et al., European Union Law; Cases and Materials (1st edn, Cambridge: CUP,
2008), p. 758.
98 C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I5659.
99 S. DE VRIES et al., Balancing Fundamental Rights with the EU Treaty Freedoms: The European
Court of Justice as ‘Tightrope’ Walker (Utrecht: Europa Instituut, 2012).
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the strike took place and the preparatory steps taken by the Austrian government,
the action was not deemed an unjustified derogation.
In Omega,100 the Court again accepted the restriction of an economic
freedom (this time regarding services) in order to adequately protect fundamental
rights.101 This case involved a German company, Omega, who operated a
‘shoot-to-kill’ laser game using sensory tags attached to the body. These tags were
manufactured by the British company Pulsar (hence, the cross-border element).
The police in the German state Nordrhein-Westfalen ordered a prohibition of the
games as they simulated homicide and were considered to be in violation of the
respect for human dignity under the German Constitution. In granting quite a
wide margin of appreciation to the German authorities (and also stating that
respect for human dignity102 was a general principle of Community law), it was
held to be a suitable measure and thus a justified restriction on EU law.
Up to this point, the relationship between fundamental rights and
derogations from the economic freedoms seemed quite politically harmonious.
Omega was followed by decisions like Sayn Wittgenstein and Dynamic Weiden,
whereby considerable Member State discretion was adopted. There was a strong
smell of respect for constitutional pluralism in the air. However, it was a sense all
but forgotten a few years later when a stale can was blown open, containing the
ugly realities of the economic and social disparities between the workers from the
centre and the workers from the periphery. The Laval103 and Viking104 decisions
caused an unprecedented uproar not just in legal academia105 but also among
social scientists, political scientists, the media, and the general public. Fritz
100 C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I 9609.
101 See COLOMBI CIACCHI, supra n. 21.
102 See for a discussion on utilizing the dignity argument to give a social angle to the rights
discourse within the construction of European private law, M.R. MARELLA, ‘A New Perspective on
Human Dignity: European Contract Law, Social Dignity and the Retreat of the Welfare State’, in
S. Grundmann (ed.), Constitutional Values and European Contract Law (Kluwer, 2008), pp.
124–147. See also in this respect A.L.B. COLOMBI CAICCHI, ‘Social Rights, Human Dignity and
European Contract Law’, in S. Grundmann (ed.), Constitutional Values and European Contract
Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2008, pp. 149–160.
103 C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767.
104 C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779.
105 JOERGES & RODL, 15(1). ELJ 2009, pp. 1–19; C. KILPATRICK, ‘Laval’s Regulatory Conundrum:
Collective Standard-Setting and the Court’s New Approach to Posted Workers’, 34. ELRev 2009;
K. APPS, ‘Damages Claims against Trade Unions after Viking and Laval’, 34. ELRev 2009, p. 141;
S. DEAKIN, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’, 364. CBR Working Paper 2008, pp. 15 and 856.
For less condemning perspectives on the decisions, see H.W. MICKLITZ, ‘Three Questions to the
Opponents of the Viking and Laval Judgments’, in European Social Observatory (Opinion Paper,
No. 8); N. REICH, ‘Free Movement v Social Rights in an enlarged European Union – the Laval and
Viking Cases before the ECJ’, 9(2). German Law Journal 2008, and L. AZOULAI, ‘The Court of
Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions for Its
Realization’, 45. Common Mkt Law Rev (Common Market Law Review) 2008, pp. 1335–1356.
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Scharpf even coined the headline: ‘The only solution is to refuse to comply with
ECJ rulings’, where it was advocated to ignore the judgments until there was a
check of the political consensus.
Although every European legal scholar is probably familiar with the cases,
it is still necessary to briefly explain the facts. In Laval, a Latvian undertaking
wished to temporarily post its workers in Vaxholm, Sweden for a construction job
on a school. They were to be paid considerably less than local tradesmen and were
thus using their competitive advantage (much cheaper costs) to undercut the
Swedish workers. The relevant Swedish labour union responded by blockading and
picketing the site, before gaining supportive ‘sympathy strikes’ from other labour
unions, eventually forcing Laval and its employees to return home. It seemed like
the Swedish unions had saved the day, looked ‘social dumping’ in the eye, and
won. However, this does not nearly paint the entire picture.
Nobody can argue that it was not an attempt at ‘social dumping’ – the
unfair use of lower conditions to undermine competitors with higher standards of
social protection (minimum wage, in this case). However, the EU Posted Workers
Directive (PWD) was created exactly to circumvent such practice.106 It requires
each Member State to lay down a ‘nucleus’ of mandatory rules for minimum
protection that must be observed by employers who temporarily post workers
outside of their home state. Among other things, this nucleus must contain
minimum rates of pay, the issue at the heart of the Laval conflict. Such rules are
designed to ensure legal certainty for foreign undertakings entering the market
and, at the same time, secure the adequate protection of workers. These minimum
rules do not prevent the application of conditions more favourable to workers.
This means that contracts more favourable to workers may be voluntarily agreed
upon, but conditions above the identifiable host state minimum nucleus cannot be
forced upon the parties. These minimum rules according to Article 3 of the
Directive may be set out (i) by law, regulation, or administrative provision, (ii) by
collective agreements declared universally applicable, or (iii) by collective
agreements that are considered generally applicable. It is up to the Member State
which of these regulatory options to choose.
Crucially, the Swedish labour model was entirely decentralized at the time,
entrusting management and labour, on a case-by-case basis at the place of work,
with the task of setting minimum wages. This system simply did not provide for
mandatory minimum rates of pay as required by Article 3 of the PWD.
Furthermore, according to Swedish law at the time, once a collective agreement is
signed, the workers to that agreement are mandatorily bound and any collective
106 For a broader discussion on social dumping and EU labour legislation, see H. COLLINS, ‘Social
Dumping, Multi-level Governance and Private Law in Employment Relationships’, in D.
Leczykiewicz & S. Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU law in Private Law Relationships
(Hart, Oxford 2013).
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action subsequent to the agreement is prohibited. However, under the so-called
Lex Britannia, this immunity from strike action was only to be granted to
agreements signed by a Swedish trade union. Therefore, a collective agreement
signed by a foreign trade union, regardless of its conditions for the employees,
was granted no protection whatsoever on the Swedish labour market from
collective action. Could this rule be said to be in the interest of protecting all
workers (as the PWD requires) or rather to protect Swedish workers? The answer
is, perhaps, in the question.
The neutrality of the Swedish state was, in effect, a delegation of power to
the national labour unions to restrict the EU freedoms. If the foreign undertaking
providing services temporarily within their territory does not comply with the
almost mysterious minimum Swedish labour standards, the trade unions
(representing, of course, mainly Swedish workers) are free to do with that
undertaking as they choose, until they either sign the agreement imposed upon
them or (more preferably from the Swedish workers’ perspective) leave the market
in question. The Swedish trade unions could have made use of Articles 5(2) and 6
of the PWD. This would have allowed the trade union to initiate legal proceedings
against the employer before the Swedish court and ensure (or at least attempt to
ensure) that the employer pay a fairer salary by legal means. Of course, no
Swedish court could guarantee those employees would be Swedish, it could just
impose a minimum salary. In comparison to an assertive countrywide strike,
which could almost guarantee the removal of (and indeed did remove) Latvian
workers from the market, the legal route was evidently less appealing. The Court
essentially held that Article 56 and Article 3 PWD precluded the Swedish labour
model and the trade union from acting in the manner it did.
Popular legal discourse on this decision begins with a strongdistinction
between the Latvian worker’s ‘economic’ right and the Swedish worker’s ‘social’ or
‘fundamental’ right. This distinction is misleading and results in a biased
discussion as to the real conflict at play. First, as Damjan Kukovec recently wrote,
what is ‘social’ and what is ‘economic’ depends entirely on your perspective,
rather like Wittgenstein’s duck/rabbit portrait. Indeed, he correctly acknowledges
that ‘what from one perspective looks like a protection against harm, from
another perspective looks like a claim for autonomy’. In the distributional sense,
social rights are nothing else than economic.107 Nonetheless, the strong
‘economic’ v. ‘social/fundamental’ dichotomy is adopted in most literature on
Laval, with the latter (the Swedish workers claim) naturally deemed of greater
significance from the outset.
Leaving this dichotomy aside, serious questions do arise regarding the
Court’s decision and require some elucidation here. The crucial points to be
107 D. KUKOVEC, ‘A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the European Union Legal
Discourse’, 4. Harvard Law School 2008.
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considered are threefold: (i) the relationship between the fundamental right to
social action and the fundamental freedoms, (ii) the horizontal effect of the
fundamental freedoms,108 and (iii) the actually balancing act performed by the
Court. In relation to the first issue, the Swedish government along with most ‘old
member countries’ argued that as industrial action falls outside EU competence,
it must therefore fall outside the application of the fundamental freedoms. As
made clear in the above sections on health care and education (not to mention
decisions in regard to direct taxation,109 war pensions,110 or the property
regime111 not discussed here), this argument is untenable. It is well established
that the competence of the Union is a different matter than the scope of
application of Union law.112 The exercise of all Member State social policies must
comply with EU law and may be constrained. This does not result in centralized
action at the EU level but instead criteria to ‘evaluate all policies pursued in a
wider-context, the transnational context’.113 In short, this provides a
‘recontextualizing’ function and a ‘reprogramming function’, whereby Member
States must ‘denationalize’ their normative standards to the objectives of
integration.114 In casu, trade unions should not be able to act without taking into
account workers from other Member States. Furthermore, the decision in
Werhof115 clearly demonstrates that the Court does not consider the ‘social
action’ rights of labour unions to fall outside EU law (primary or secondary).
Indeed, one who condemns the Laval decision for undermining a key human
right must not ignore a different yet related key principle stemming from Werhof
– the freedom of association contains the equally fundamental ‘negative’ side of
the right to strike, which Saudre calls droit d’association négatif, i.e., the right
not to be forced to sign a collective agreement. This was recognized by the
European Court of Human Rights over 15 years ago, incidentally in proceedings
against Sweden.116 One may wonder as the positive side of the right is of such
108 For a broader analysis on this issue, see COLOMBI CIACCHI, supra n. 13.
109 Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03, Mobistar SA v. Commune de Fléron and Belgacom Mobile
SA v. Commune de Schaerbeek [2005] ECR I-7723.
110 C-192/05 Tas Hagen, R. A. Tas v. Raadskamer WUBO [2006] ECR I-10451.
111 C-350/92 Spain v. Council [1995] ECR I-1985.
112 In response to the argument that the limited application of Community rules to collective
bargaining action in competition law (as applied in Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751,
para. 54) should be used by analogy to the EU freedoms here, two points must be made: first,
Albany concerned competition law where business and labour organizations negotiated over a
pension fund; it did not concern industrial action, and second, there is ‘no statutory exemption’
from the application of EU free movement for collective action that renders market access more
difficult for foreign individual businesses.
113 See AZOULAI, supra n. 105.
114 Ibid.
115 Case C-499/04 Werhof v. Freeway Traffic Services GmbH & Co KG [2006] ECR I-2397, para. 33.
116 See decision Gustavsson v. Sweden ECHR [1996] 637.
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‘fundamental’ importance, then why is the other side of that right (equally at play,
but for the Latvians) readily ignored in popular discourse.
As for the second main issue on horizontal effect, the Court adopted a
functional (effet utile argument) approach. It relied upon its case law, whereby the
free movement provisions shall apply between private parties when:117 (i) the
private party is an organization regulating in a collective manner employment or
self-employment118 or (ii) the private party imposes a discriminatory condition as
part of an established regional practice in relation to access to employment.119
The Court recognized that the collective action of the trade union is aimed at the
conclusion of an agreement that is meant to regulate the work of the employees
collectively. As Azoulai points out, this means that trade unions are not bound by
the freedom of movement in so far as they assume a state regulatory task but are
actually bound in so far as they behave as powerful social actors. The right to
strike and the right of collective bargaining have to be understood as types of
power: power to strike and power to negotiate. Therefore, instead of conferring
on collective actions a certain judicial immunity, the recognition of strike action
as a power demands certain control.120 On a transnational level, this requires
taking responsibility of excluded interest from other Member States – a
responsibility that the Court did not shy away from.
On the final point regarding the actual reconciliation of economic and
social requirements, one main criticism arises. Initially, the Court did recognize
the right to strike as a fundamental right that may serve as a justified restriction
on Article 56 TFEU. Unfortunately however, this recognition arose with regard to
the question of whether the exercise of the right to take collective action falls
within the legal scope of the economic provisions. It was not explicitly restated
when actually balancing the conflicting rights. Here, the Court did not recognize
the ’fundamental right’ nature of collective action (as it did earlier in the decision
on the scope of EU law) but accepted the protection of workers as an ‘overriding’
public interest, which may justify a restriction on the fundamental freedoms. It
should have explicitly repeated that collective action is a fundamental right as
such and may justifiably be restricted by the economic freedoms and vice versa.
This would have displaced any burden of proof put upon the protection of the
117 Note the other exception: if the party is apparently private but is actually acting on behalf of the
state, see Case C-325/00 Commission v. Germany [2002] ECR I-9977.
118 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.Bosman; Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR
I-1577.
119 Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139.
120 Note that this recognition of strike action as a power that demands control is evident in every
welfare state in the EU – nowhere is the right to strike absolute. It must always occur within the
qualifying limits of the law (see also Art. 28 Charter). For example, in the United Kingdom, there
exists no self-standing right to strike. Instead, workers must rely on a narrow exception from
tortuous liability.
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fundamental right.121 Quite simply, the Court could have taken a more
Schmidberger-like approach when outlining the balance to be taken (see para. 89
of the said decision). In other words, in assessing whether the restriction was
objectively justified, the Court should not only have explicitly recognized the
protection of fundamental rights in light of the economic freedoms but it also
should have recognized the degree of interference the protection of the economic
freedoms has on the fundamental right in question. In a sense, a type of ‘double
proportionality test’ is required. As AG Trstenjak said in Commission v.
Germany:122 such an analysis should not be confined to the appropriateness and
necessity of restricting a fundamental right in light of the benefits of the
economic freedoms, it must also include an assessment of whether the restriction
of the economic freedom is appropriate and necessary for the benefit of
protecting the fundamental right.
In sum, most commentators have picked up on this as an unacceptable
weakening of the fundamental right to strike, as a decupling of the social from the
economic constitution. Looking beyond the methodological failures of the Court,
it is maintained here that the restriction at hand remained objectively
unjustifiable given the nature of the Lex Britannia and the Swedish labour model.
The decision represented a small win for the workers on the periphery. They were
protected from illegitimate strike action and guaranteed equal treatment should
they seek to provide services in Sweden. Any claims of neo-liberalism in Laval are
unfounded and expose an unwarranted phobia of the periphery.123 It is safer to
say that the result in this instance is better explained by the rationale underlying
neo-corporatism.124
The decision in Viking has also been subject to heavy criticisms, although
unlike in Laval, the PWD was not at issue and the CJEU did not apply the
proportionality test itself but left it to the referring national court. Popular
critique claims that this decision further confirmed the CJEU’s lack of respect for
the fundamental right to strike. Essentially, the Court restated such a right is not
absolute (nothing new here from a national or international law perspective), and
121 On this, see A. SOMEK, ‘Das europäische Sozialmodell: Diskriminierungsschutz und Wettbewerb’,
3. Juridikum 2008, p. 118.
122 Case C-503/04 Commission v. Germany [2007] ECR I-06153.
123 Empirical data on the number of posted workers throughout the Union remain quite low.
Furthermore and in spite of populist views from the centre, it is not Romania, Bulgaria, and
other countries on the periphery who send the most posted workers, but France, Poland, and
Germany. They are then followed by Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal. See
European Commission report on ‘Posting of Workers in the European Union and EFTA
Countries’ in 2008, 2009, and 2010.
124 After all, the Swedish State was required to be more present in the regulatory process. See E.
ENGLE, ‘A Viking We Will Go! Neo-Corporatism and Social Europe’, 11(6). German Law Review
2010, pp. 633–652.
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it will be deemed a justified restriction on Article 49 TFEU provided its objective
is the protection of workers, that it is suitable for ensuring the attainment of this
legitimate objective, and it does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this
objective. Therefore, when the jobs or conditions of employment at issue are not
jeopardized, the strike action cannot be justified.
Critics have argued that the Viking decision disfavours the labour
movement because effective industrial action provokes economic dislocation.125
However, this is equally a reason as to why industrial action ought to be treated
with caution – it is powerful. Any unnecessary disruptions of production flows
ultimately disfavour the individual worker. As AG Maduro pointed out, the key
question is to what ends collective action may be used and how far it can go. In
the current case, the International Transport Workers Federation’s (trade union
in question) policy on ‘flags of convenience’ required the automatic instigation of
collective action upon request by one member (the Finish Seaman’s Union in this
case), ‘irrespective of whether or not the owner’s exercise of its right of freedom of
establishment is liable to have a harmful effect on the work or conditions of
employment of its employees’. Note in this respect an undertaking given by
Viking (the owner) that no employees would be made redundant due to the
reflagging of the ship. In addition, one must be aware of the potential nationalist
motives behind the automatic initiation of strike action irrespective of the owner’s
harmful effect on employee well-being or conditions of work. Surely, such strike
action should be treated with caution. In any case, the application of the
proportionality test here was left to the referring court. Subjecting collective and
coercive means of action to the test of justification126 does not appear, at least to
the author, to be a cause for such grave concern.
However, the same criticisms may be directed at the Court’s motivation in
this decision as in the Laval decision. The weighing up of economic freedoms and
fundamental rights did not require an implied a priori hierarchy of rights. Again,
the Court failed to make this clear, leaving a largely balanced outcome open to
unnecessary but valid concerns in how that balance was actually achieved.
6. Conclusions
In protecting market actor autonomy from state and powerful non-state actor
interference, it is quite clear that the above judgments conform to some model of
the ‘private law society’ – however, is this model more neo-liberal or ordo-liberal?
125 A.C.L. DAVIES, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’, 37.
Indus L.J. (Industrial Law Journal) 2008, p. 126.
126 The strike must be (i) aimed at protecting workers, (ii) whose job or conditions of employment
were under serious threat, and (iii) when the trade union had exhausted any other means at its
disposal.
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More generally, what can be said about the effects of the above decisions in the
quest to achieve a ‘socially just’ Europe?
Admittedly, such a case-by-case approach results in some degree of
regulatory uncertainty and is vulnerable to political attack. This is even more so
in sensitive policy areas of national control. In a number of the decisions
examined (particularly Laval and Viking), legitimate concerns remain over the
Court’s explicit reasoning and methodology. As warned by de Vries and others,127
the Court must not engage in automatically subordinating fundamental rights to
the economic freedoms (i.e., justifying fundamental rights in light of the
latter).128 This does not necessitate excessive formalism but rather the explicit
rejection of a priori hierarchy between the two.129 Just as the economic freedoms
should not be given a higher status than fundamental rights, they do serve the
backbone of the Union and must not be considered de facto inferior. It is
important to note that this is a criticism of the Court’s methodology and, in light
of the above analysis, not at the actual substantive outcome. Although this
methodological failing is a legitimate concern and should not be downplayed, it
must be contextualized in light of the following observations.
First, the normative individualistic130 approach favoured by the Court in
the above decisions (i.e., that state and powerful non-state actor interference must
be justified in the last instance to the concerned individual) was guided by
non-discriminatory criteria, free from parochial bias. Excluded individual interests
were effectively incorporated into national policymaking via a form of
transnational justice that Micklitz describes as access justice.131 In doing so, the
Court adopted a type of ‘original position’ to reduce the negative externalities of
norms developed within the nation state (i.e., limited to territorially based notions
and political membership).
Second, the above decisions evidence how blurred the distinction between
the ‘economic’ and the ‘social’ really is. As Colombi Ciacchi points out that the
classic distinction between liberty (first generation) rights and social (second
generation) rights is vulnerable to semantics – what matters is how they are
applied in practice.132 The same holds true regarding distinctions made within the
category of ‘social’ (second generation) rights itself. This is taken for granted in
popular legal and political discourse on the decisions at hand. This study
highlights how ‘economic’ mobility was applied in practice as a means to achieve
127 DE VRIES et al., Balancing Fundamental Rights with the EU Treaty Freedoms: The European
Court of Justice as ‘Tightrope’ Walker, p. 32.
128 See SOMEK, supra n. 121 and also COLOMBI CIACCHI, supra n. 21.
129 For further discussion on this, see DE VRIES, supra n. 127, p. 42.
130 See COLOMBI CIACCHI, supra n. 21.
131 See MICKLITZ, supra n. 13.
132 COLOMBI CIACCHI, in S. Grundmann (ed.), Constitutional Values and European Contract Law,
p. 149.
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fundamental human entitlements (regardless of preferred classification) – such as
access to crucial health care, the continuation of one’s education, integration into
society, and the protection of fair employment opportunities. Thus, the simplified
economic v. social dichotomy colours the true application of economic mobility in
tainted political terms and ignores the more wholesome conceptualization of
these mobility provisions. A fairer critique must recognize that each decision
concerned freedoms and limitations. As Kukovec points out,133 once we recognize
this, we begin to look at policies and justifications with a more balanced nuance.
‘Economic’ mobility in the above decisions was not understood by the Court as an
end in itself but rather as the primary functional means – at the Court’s disposal –
to protect individual freedom from disproportionate limitations.
Third (and perhaps most importantly), such protection has not resulted in
a situation whereby the other normative objectives of social justice are ignored.
Interstate economic private legal relations and public law values were understood
as necessary compliments. Using the proportionality principle as its central axiom,
the decisions in question did not ignore redistributive national goals or negatively
impact the social claims economic mobility relies upon – rather, it may be argued
that the opposite occurred and the decisions compensated somewhat for
inadequate national policies. No evidence above suggests that the Court’s
protection of such market transactions has jeopardized the stability of national
health care systems (s. 3), education services (s. 4), or the protection afforded to
human rights (s. 5). Discretionary state power has indeed been limited but not to
a laissez faire extent. In none of the above decisions did an end to all regulation
occur. The term deregulation often used here is notoriously misleading.134 In
practice, what occurred is a combination of deregulation and re-regulation, with
the end result often increased regulation (e.g., clearer rules on cross-border
health care or on market access for posted workers).
Finally, should Europe be in the midst of what Weiler may call a
‘constitutional moment’, the acute issue does not appear to be the judicial
entrenchment of neo-liberalism but rather the unwarranted condemnation in
popular discourse of the substantive outcomes actually reached in the above
decisions. Although this article only focused on the judicial branch of the EU,
certain economic mobility provisions, and the normative objectives of ‘social
justice’ in specific policy areas, it does nonetheless evidence some worth in
perceiving the EU’s performance and raison d’être more holistically.
133 See KUKOVEC, supra n. 107.
134 See, for more on this, G. MAJONE, Deregulation or Re-regulation? Policy Making in the European







Professor of Law and Governance
at University of Groningen, Academic




Groningen Centre of Law and
Governance - Faculty Board
Oude Kijk in 't Jatstraat 26
9712 EK Groningen
The Netherlands
Tel.: (+31) 050 363 5687
E-mail: a.l.b.colombi.ciacchi@rug.nl
SALVATORE PATTI
Professor of Private Law at University
‘La Sapienza’, Rome
Università degli Studi di Roma ‘La
Sapienza’
Piazzale Aldo Moro 5
00185 Roma
Italy




Vinerian Professor of English Law, All






Tel.: (+44) 0 1865 271491
E-mail: hugh.collins@law.ox.ac.uk
LORENZ KAEHLER
Professor for Private Law, Civil
Procedure, and Philosophy of Law at






Tel.: (+49) 0421 218-66069
E-mail: lkaehler@uni-bremen.de
OLHA O. CHEREDNYCHENKO
Associate Professor of European
Private Law and Comparative Law at
the University of Groningen, the
Netherlands
University of Groningen
Faculty of Law, Administrative Law —
Administrative Law and Public
Administration
Oude Kijk in 't Jatstraat 26
9712 EK Groningen
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 50 363 5658
E-mail: o.o.cherednychenko@rug.nl
TERESA RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS
BALLELL
Associate Professor of Commercial
Law, University Carlos III of Madrid
University Carlos III of Madrid
Madrid
Spain
Tel.: +34 916 24 57 67
E-mail: tla@der-pr.uc3m.es
ZEESHAN MANSOOR
Research Fellow Endowed Chair Law
and Governance at the Groningen
European Review of Private Law 5-2014 [811–812] ©Kluwer Law International BV. Printed in Great Britain.
811




Groningen Centre of Law and
Governance — Faculty Board
Oude Kijk in 't Jatstraat 26
9712 EK Groningen
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 50 363 9617
E-mail: z.mansoor@rug.nl
ADAM MCCANN
PhD Candidate at the Centre for
Law & Governance and Research
Fellow for Endowed Chair of Law &




Groningen Centre of Law and
Governance — Faculty Board
Oude Kijk in 't Jatstraat 26
9712 EK Groningen
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 50 363 2836
E-mail: a.mccann@rug.nl
INGRID KONING
Assistant professor at the Molengraaff
Institute for Private Law, Utrecht
University
Utrecht University
Molengraaff Institute for Private Law
Janskerkhof 12 3512 BL Utrecht The
Netherlands
Tel.: +31 30 253 7198
E-mail: ingrid.koning@uu.nl
ANDREW BELL











Dr.iur., LL.B., LL.M. University
Assistant, Institute for European Tort
Law (Austrian Academy of Sciences and
University of Graz) Reichsratsstrasse
17/2 1010 Vienna Austria








Tel.: +49 851 509-2314
E-mail: florian.eichel@uni-passau.de
812
european review of private law 
revue européenne de droit privé
europäische zeitschrift für privatrecht
Guidelines for authors
The European Review of Private Law aims to provide a forum which facilitates the  development of 
European Private Law. It publishes work of interest to academics and practitioners across 
European boundaries. Comparative work in any fi eld of private law is welcomed. The journal 
deals especially with comparative case law. Work focusing on one jurisdiction alone is accepted, 
 provided it has a strong cross-border interest.
The Review requires the submission of manuscripts by e-mail attachment, preferably in Word. 
Please do not forget to add your complete mailing address, telephone number, fax number and/or 
e-mail address when you submit your manuscript.
Manuscripts should be written in standard English, French or German.
Directives pour les Auteurs
La Revue européenne de droit privé a pour objectif de faciliter, par la constitution d’un forum, la 
mise au point d’un Droit Privé Européen. Elle publie des articles susceptibles d’intéresser aussi 
bien l’universitaire que le praticien, sur un plan européen. Nous serons heureux d’ouvrir nos 
pages aux travaux comparatifs dans tout domaine du droit privé. La Revue est consacrée en 
particulier á l’étude comparée de la jurisprudence. Les travaux concentrés sur une seule juridic-
tion sont admissibles, à condition de présenter un intérêt dépassant les frontières.
Nous souhaitons recevoir les textes par courrier électronique, de préférence en Word. Ajoutez 
l’adresse postale compléte et le numéro de téléphone de l’auteur, un numéro de télécopie et 
l’adresse électronique.
Les textes doivent être rédigés en langue anglaise, française ou allemande standard.
Leitfaden für Autoren
Die Europäische Zeitschrift für Privatrecht will ein Forum bieten, um die Entwicklung des 
 europäischen Zivilrechts zu fördern. Sie veröffentlicht Arbeiten, die für Akademiker und Juristen 
in ganz Europa grenzüberschreitend von Interesse sind. Vergleichende Untersuchungen aus 
jedem Bereich des Zivilrechts sind willkommen. Die Zeitschrift befasst sich insbesondere mit 
 vergleichender Rechtsprechung. Artikel, die sich auf ein einziges Hoheitsgebiet konzentrieren, 
 können angenommen werden, wenn sie von besonderem grenzüberschreitenden .dnisesseretnI
Wir möchten ihre Beiträge per E-Mail erhalten und bevorzugen Dateien in Word. Bitte geben Sie 
ihre Anschrift, Telefonnummer, Telefaxnummer und/oder E-Mailadresse an. 
Manuskripte sind in korrektem Englisch, Französisch oder Deutsch zu verfassen.
Style guide
A style guide for contributors can be found in online at http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/
europeanreviewofprivatelaw.
Index
An annual index will be published in issue No. 6 of each volume.
european review of private law 
revue européenne de droit privé
europäische zeitschrift für privatrecht
Contact
Jessy Emaus, e-mail:   erpl@kluwerlaw.com
Editors
E.H. Hondius, Universiteit Utrecht, Molengraaff Instituut voor Privaatrecht, 
The Netherlands. 
M.E. Storme, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Editorial Board
W. Cairns, Manchester Metropolitan University, England, U.K.; Florence G’Sell-Macrez,  Université 
de Lorraine, France; J.F. Gerkens, Université de Liège, Belgium ; A. Janssen, Westfälische
Wilhelms- Universität Münster, Germany; R. Jox, Katholische Hochschule Nordrhein-Westfalen,
Abteilung Köln, Germany; D. Ross Macdonald, University of Dundee, Scotland, U.K.; M. Martín-Casals,
Universitat de Girona, Catalunya, Spain; B. Pozzo, Università dell’Insubria-Como, Italy; S. Whittaker,
St. John’s College, Oxford University, Oxford, England, U.K.    
Advisory Board
E. Baginska, Uniwersytet Gdanski, Gdansk, Poland; C. von Bar, European Legal Studies Institute/Institut für
Europäische Rechtswissenschaft, Universität Osnabrück, Germany; H. Beale, University of  Warwick, England,
U.K.; R. Clark, Faculty of Law, University College Dublin, Republic of Ireland; F. Ferrari, Università
degli Studi di Verona, Italy; A. Gambaro, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy; G. Garcia Cantero,
Departamento de derecho privado, Universidad de Zaragoza, Aragon, Spain; J. Ghestin, Université
de Paris, France; M. Hesselink, Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands; C. Jamin,  Ecole de droit
de Sciences Po, Paris, France; K.D. Kerameus, Ethniko kai kapodistriako Panepistimio Athinon, Athinai, Greece;
H. Kötz, Bucerius Law School, Hamburg, Germany; O. Lando, Juridisk Institut Handelshojskolen
Copenhagen, Denmark; Kåre Lilleholt, Universitetet i Oslo, Institutt for privatrett, Oslo, Norway;
B. Lurger, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Austria; H.L. MacQueen, School of Law, University
of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K.; B.S. Markesinis, University College London,  England, U.K./University
of  Texas, Austin, Texas, U.S.A.; V. Mikelenas, Teises Fakultetas, Vilniaus Universiteto, Lithuania; 
A. Pinto Monteiro, Universidade de Coimbra, Faculdade de direito, Portugal; C. Ramberg, Stockholms
universitet, Sweden; R. Sacco, Università degli Studi di Torino, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Italy;
D. Spielmann, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France; L. Tichy, Univerzita Karlova,
Praha, the Czech Republic; F. Werro, Faculté de droit, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland;
T. Wilhelmsson, Helsingen Yliopisto, Finland.
Founded in 1992 by Ewoud Hondius and Marcel Storme
ISSN 0928-9801 
All Rights Reserved. ©2014 Kluwer Law International
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilised in any form or 
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information 
storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. 
Typeface ITC Bodoni Twelve
Design Dingoj | Peter Oosterhout, Diemen-Amsterdam
Printed and Bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY.
